Türkiye After Mr. Erdoğan: Policy, Power, and the Path Forward

Introduction

Türkiye stands at a pivotal moment as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  approaches the end of his final term in office. After more than 21 years at Türkiye’s helm – first as prime minister and then as an increasingly powerful president – Mr. Erdoğan  will be constitutionally barred from seeking another term ^{5 2}. He has himself hinted that the March 2024 local elections marked a “finale” for his active campaign career, speaking of entrusting the nation to “brothers and sisters” who will succeed him ¹¹. This impending transition raises urgent questions about Türkiye’s future direction. How will the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), so long defined by Mr. Erdoğan ’s towering presence, maintain control without its charismatic leader at the forefront? What internal power struggles might erupt as potential successors vie for influence, and how will Türkiye’s fragmented opposition recalibrate its strategy in this new context?

This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of Türkiye’s political, economic, and geopolitical outlook in the post-Mr. Erdoğan era. First, it presents scenario analysis for the near future, examining how the AKP could attempt to retain power absent Mr. Erdoğan s personal magnetism, what fissures might emerge within the ruling party, and how opposition forces may evolve their approach. Next, it offers concrete policy recommendations for the AKP leadership – strategies to stabilise Türkiye’s troubled economy and tame high inflation, methods to sustain political power without Mr. Erdoğan’s singular influence, plans for recalibrating diplomacy with key regional and global actors, and reforms to address domestic discontent (from youth emigration to corruption and institutional decay). The paper then explores Mr. Erdoğan’s complex legacy and the possible roles he might play after leaving office – whether as a behind-the-scenes power broker, a symbolic elder statesman, a target of legal accountability, or a retiree stepping away from politics. A comparative analysis follows, drawing lessons from other nations’ transitions after long-serving strongmen (such as Russia after Boris Yeltsin and Argentina after Carlos Menem) to shed light on what Türkiye might expect. Finally, a strategic conclusion provides clear guidance for AKP policymakers on navigating the path forward to maintain national stability and their political dominance in a post-Mr. Erdoğan  Türkiye. All analysis is grounded in current data and diverse sources, incorporating both Turkish and international perspectives to ensure a realistic and balanced assessment.

Scenario Analysis: Politics in a Post-Erdoğan Türkiye

AKP Continuity and Internal Power Dynamics

Mr. Erdoğan’s departure will trigger an unprecedented succession challenge for the AKP. For over two decades, the party’s identity and electoral success have been inextricably tied to Mr. Erdoğan’s personal leadership, or what scholars call his charismatic authority ². He is not only President and AKP chairman but the unifying “reis” (leader) for a broader coalition – commanding loyalty from cabinet ministers, bureaucrats, business elites, and millions of voters who feel a personal bond with him ². This raises a fundamental question: can Mr. Erdoğan’s political edifice survive without Mr. Erdoğan  himself?

Observers envision two contrasting scenarios. One argument holds that once Mr. Erdoğan exits, Türkiye could “return to normal,” with no successor able to command the same dominance ². Indeed, past elections suggest “Mr. Erdoğanism without Mr. Erdoğan” may falter at the ballot box. In the June 2015 parliamentary elections and the 2019 local elections, AKP candidates performed poorly when Mr. Erdoğan’s name was not on the ticket ². This view likens Mr. Erdoğan  to the keystone of an arch – remove him, and the structure collapses. By this logic, the AKP might splinter without its figurehead, opening space for a more pluralistic alternating factions ².

An alternative scenario counters that the regime Mr. Erdoğan  built can persist under new management ². Proponents note that Mr. Erdoğan  spent years constructing a formidable party machinery and state apparatus – from grassroots AKP organisations to a vast social welfare system, a tamed media, and loyal security forces ². These institutional levers of power could “make a reis out of even a mediocre operator,” as one analyst argues, especially if that new leader is propped up by the inherited tools of incumbency ². In other words, the “New Türkiye” regime might not evaporate overnight. With the presidency’s immense executive powers in place and the ruling party’s networks greased by years of state resources, an Mr. Erdoğan anointee could sustain the hegemony – particularly if Mr. Erdoğan  carefully blesses a successor to preempt factional infighting ². In this scenario, the AKP would aim for continuity: Mr. Erdoğan  2.0 in policy if not in personality.

Which scenario unfolds will depend on how the AKP manages its internal dynamics in the coming years. Thus far, Mr. Erdoğan  has not groomed a clear heir-apparent – in fact, potential rivals within the party were often sidelined or purged during his tenure. Former high-profile AKP figures like Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan broke away to form their own parties after falling out with Mr. Erdoğan , highlighting how the President tolerated no challenger. Now, as 2028 approaches, multiple ambitious figures will likely jockey to fill the void. Internal power struggles are a real risk. Without Mr. Erdoğan ’s unifying (and disciplining) presence, rival camps within the AKP and its nationalist allies (the MHP) could erupt into open contest. For example, hardline nationalists versus pragmatic conservatives might clash over the party’s direction. There may also be tension between long-serving loyalists in Mr. Erdoğan’s inner circle and rising younger politicians who see an opportunity for advancement. Furthermore, the question of coalition partners looms: the AKP relies on MHP support for its parliamentary majority. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s moves indicate he is keen to shape the succession outcome – even floating a constitutional amendment to allow Mr. Erdoğan yet another run in 2028 ⁵. That Bahçeli would publicly suggest extending Mr. Erdoğan’s tenure reveals concerns that without Mr. Erdoğan, the People’s Alliance might fragment. It also suggests the AKP-MHP bloc could resort to extraordinary measures (like changing the constitution or calling an early election) to maintain their grip on power ⁵. While Mr. Erdoğan  for now has reiterated he has “no personal ambition” to seek another term ¹², the behind-the-scenes calculations may change as 2028 draws near, especially if the ruling bloc fears losing power.

Preparing for a post-Mr. Erdoğan  leadership transition will therefore be critical for AKP stability. The wisest course for the party may be to select and begin elevating a successor well before the next presidential election. Mr. Erdoğan  hinting at a “transfer” of trust to his successors ¹¹ is a start, but it needs to be followed by concrete action. Naming a capable successor early could prevent a damaging power vacuum or fratricidal feud after Mr. Erdoğan exits ². However, choosing that individual will be delicate. Members of Mr. Erdoğan’s family have been involved in politics (his son-in-law Berat Albayrak was once a prominent minister), but familial succession appears unlikely – Mr. Erdoğan’s close relatives have either stayed out of politics or proven too controversial to rally popular support ². More probable is a successor from the party’s ideological core or provincial organisational network, someone with longstanding AKP credentials but without Mr. Erdoğan’s personal aura. A technocrat or bureaucrat – say, a figure like current Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan – might be competent in statecraft yet could struggle to win elections due to a lack of retail political skills ². By contrast, a party veteran skilled in campaigning and with populist touch (perhaps a provincial boss or former mayor from within AKP’s ranks) might better connect with voters, even if they lack Mr. Erdoğan’s charisma. Whoever ascends will need to quickly cultivate public legitimacy and authority over the AKP machinery. Crucially, Mr. Erdoğan ’s blessing could make or break that process. If before 2028 Mr. Erdoğan  publicly anoints a successor as his candidate, it would bestow a degree of his personal legitimacy and discourage rivals from splitting the party ². Conversely, if he demurs or if multiple AKP figures claim his mantle, the party could divide into warring fiefdoms. For the AKP, maintaining unity through this transition is paramount – otherwise the opposition will be poised to capitalise on any crack in the edifice.

The Evolving Role and Strategy of the Opposition

While the AKP grapples with succession, Türkiye’s opposition sees a historic opening on the horizon. Having endured years of electoral defeat against Mr. Erdoğan’s formidable campaign machine, opposition parties are now sensing that the “Mr. Erdoğan era” may truly be nearing its end. In recent contests, there have been signs of opposition resurgence that foreshadow how they might compete in a post-Mr. Erdoğan  landscape. Most strikingly, in the March 2024 municipal elections – the last nationwide vote – the opposition dealt the AKP its worst setback in decades. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) not only held onto major cities won in 2019 (including Istanbul and Ankara) but also expanded its reach into several provinces traditionally considered AKP strongholds ^{13 4}. The CHP and its allies captured around 38% of the national local vote, winning mayoral races even in parts of the conservative Anatolian heartland ¹³. Istanbul’s CHP mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, in particular, scored a resounding re-election, defeating the AKP’s candidate by a wide margin ⁴. These results “reasserted the opposition as a political force” and signalled that significant chunks of the electorate are willing to choose an opposition alternative when Mr. Erdoğan  himself is not on the ballot ⁴. President Mr. Erdoğan  himself acknowledged his alliance had “lost altitude” nationwide, vowing to “fix” any mistakes before the next general elections ⁴. For the opposition, this momentum is encouraging: it suggests that Mr. Erdoğan ’s vulnerabilities are growing and the AKP’s hold is weakening after 20+ years in power ¹³.

Nonetheless, the opposition’s path forward is fraught with challenges. They must remain united and strategic in the face of an AKP that will not easily relinquish power. One immediate issue is leadership and candidate strategy for the post-Mr. Erdoğan era. The 2023 presidential election saw a broad opposition alliance coalesce behind CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who gained an unprecedented 47.8% of the vote in the runoff ⁹ – a strong showing but ultimately a loss. Many within the opposition now argue it is time for a new standard-bearer with broader appeal, given that Kılıçdaroğlu has lost multiple elections since 2010 ⁹. Prior to the 2023 vote, popular figures like İmamoğlu (mayor of Istanbul) and Mansur Yavaş (mayor of Ankara) were floated as potential joint opposition candidates ⁹, and their local victory margins since then have only burnished their credibility. Indeed, İmamoğlu has emerged as a chief rival to Mr. Erdoğan  and the default leader-in-waiting for the opposition camp ⁴. However, this has provoked push back from the regime. In a dramatic turn of events in March 2025, İmamoğlu was arrested and jailed on charges of misuse of office – just days before the CHP was to officially select him as its presidential candidate for the 2028 race ¹. The timing and context made this appear to many as a brazen attempt to sideline the one person who could galvanise a broad anti-AKP coalition, rather than a bona fide anti-corruption move 1. İmamoğlu’s detention sparked nationwide protests and outrage among opposition supporters ¹. While these protests have since ebbed, the episode temporarily boosted the opposition’s morale and unity – the CHP and other parties condemned the jailing as political and seemed to close ranks ¹.

Going forward, the opposition’s evolving strategy will need to account for both opportunities and risks in this new phase. There are a few key considerations:

• Maintaining Unity and Managing Competition: A major strength of the Turkish opposition in recent years has been its ability to form coalitions across ideological lines – for example, the “Nation Alliance” united secularists (CHP), nationalists (Good Party/IYI), and others, and it tacitly cooperated with the pro-Kurdish HDP in 2023. To win in a post-Mr. Erdoğan  election, this big-tent approach remains essential. However, unity will be tested when deciding who should lead the charge. With Mr. Erdoğan  out of the picture, opposition figures may be more tempted to assert themselves. The CHP itself is navigating an internal transition: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was challenged in a late-2023 party congress by younger politician Özgür Özel. By April 2025, Özel had taken over as CHP chairman, consolidating his power at an emergency congress ¹. The CHP even symbolically declared the imprisoned İmamoğlu as its presidential nominee after a primary (a largely symbolic move given his jailing) ¹. But if İmamoğlu remains barred from running, the question of an alternative candidate will resurface, potentially pitting opposition leaders against each other ¹. Özgür Özel himself could be a contender, as could Ankara’s Mansur Yavaş or others. The opposition must handle this process carefully to avoid fragmentation. Past strongman transitions show that if the opposition splinters into rival camps, the ruling party can exploit those divisions to stay in power. The challenge will be for the Nation Alliance (and its possible successors) to agree on a single presidential candidate and coordinated parliamentary strategy well ahead of 2028, without letting egos and party rivalries divide them ¹. In essence, they need a smooth primary or consensus-building mechanism behind closed doors, rather than a public feud. The AKP has already shown willingness to use state power to knock out a popular opponent; the opposition should expect more “law fare” or electoral engineering and be prepared to adapt (for instance, by having backup candidates or protest strategies if their frontrunner is disqualified).
  
• Broadening Appeal Beyond the Base: Historically, the CHP-led opposition struggled to win over conservative, rural, and pious segments of Turkish society. The CHP’s vote share was stuck around 25% for years, confined largely to secular urban voters ¹. Under Kılıçdaroğlu, there were deliberate efforts to broaden this base – reaching out to Kurdish voters with promises of reconciliation, and to religious conservatives by nominating alliance partners palatable to them ¹. These efforts paid some dividends: in 2023, for the first time, a CHP-led candidate (Kılıçdaroğlu) won nearly half the vote nationwide, including competitive showings in areas far beyond the party’s old strongholds ⁹. Going forward, the opposition must double down on this inclusive strategy. That means continuing to court the Kurdish electorate (roughly 15-20% of voters) through respectful dialogue and addressing issues like minority rights and decentralisation – without alienating Turkish nationalists. It also means assuaging the concerns of devout Sunnis and traditional communities that a post-Mr. Erdoğan  government would respect religious freedoms and not revert to old-style militant secularism. The CHP’s newer generation of leaders seem aware of this necessity. In fact, both İmamoğlu and Yavaş have crossover appeal: İmamoğlu, though CHP, has shown an ability to connect with Kurdish voters and pious poor in Istanbul; Yavaş, originally a nationalist, can attract centre-right voters uncomfortable with the AKP’s excesses ¹. The opposition should leverage such figures and perhaps even consider a joint ticket (for example, president and vice-president nominees from different backgrounds) to signal unity across Türkiye’s divides. The message needs to focus on competent governance, economic relief, and restoring rule of law – issues that resonate broadly – rather than ideological battles. In short, to beat the AKP without Mr. Erdoğan , the opposition must present itself as a safe and unifying alternative for a majority of Turks, including many who once voted for Mr. Erdoğan  but are now unhappy with inflation, corruption, or authoritarian drift.
  
• Navigating Identity Politics and Authoritarian Push back: A related strategic point is the need to avoid playing into the AKP’s narrative traps. Mr. Erdoğan ’s political playbook often relied on polarising society – framing the opposition as enemies of the people, terrorists, or Western puppets, thereby rallying his base. In the post-Mr. Erdoğan  era, AKP hardliners might still employ these tactics, perhaps even more aggressively, to compensate for the loss of their leader’s personal appeal. The opposition should be careful not to take the bait of identity-based polemics (e.g. secular vs. religious culture wars) and instead keep the public discourse on bread-and-butter issues and democratic reforms ¹. They have already gained moral high ground in the eyes of many by highlighting the AKP’s abuses – for instance, the jailing of İmamoğlu was widely seen as proof of the government’s fear and willingness to subvert democracy ¹⁴. By consistently emphasising justice, economic competence, and inclusion, the opposition can maintain an image as the harbinger of normalisation and hope. Internationally, they have support from Western allies concerned about Türkiye’s autocracy ¹⁴. However, they must prepare for the reality that the regime (even without Mr. Erdoğan ) may intensify repression to hold power. This could include more arrests of opposition figures, control over media narratives, or even attempts to alter election rules. The opposition’s strategy, therefore, should include robust election monitoring, coalition-building with civil society, and perhaps engagement with international organisations to uphold fair election standards. The events after İmamoğlu’s arrest – protests and public outcry – show that Turkish society has latent energy for democratic change ¹. The opposition will need to channel that energy into sustained political mobilisation through the next three years. Keeping supporters engaged (for example, via town halls, issue-based campaigns, and local organisations) even between elections will be important so that momentum is not lost by 2028 ¹.

In sum, the opposition’s role in a Türkiye after Mr. Erdoğan  could transform from perennial underdog to genuine governing contender. But success is not guaranteed. They face an AKP determined to use all levers of incumbency to preserve power, even without its long-time captain. The opposition’s best chance lies in unity around a compelling candidate, a broadened coalition that appeals to all segments of society, and a disciplined focus on democratic and economic renewal rather than divisive ideological debates. If they manage these factors, the post-Mr. Erdoğan  election may become a real contest for Türkiye’s future – one the opposition has a fighting chance to win for the first time in a generation.

Policy Recommendations for the Post-Mr. Erdoğan  AKP

If the AKP wishes to maintain its political dominance and ensure Türkiye’s stability after Mr. Erdoğan , it will need to pursue a strategic policy course on multiple fronts. Simply put, the party can no longer rely on Mr. Erdoğan ’s personal charisma to paper over policy failings; it must deliver tangible results and reforms to retain public support. Below are concrete recommendations in key policy areas:

Stabilising the Economy and Curbing Inflation

Challenge: Türkiye’s economy has been severely strained in recent years, with soaring inflation, a volatile currency, and eroded investor confidence. Unorthodox monetary policies – driven in part by Mr. Erdoğan ’s insistence on low interest rates despite high inflation – fuelled a cost-of-living crisis. Annual consumer inflation officially peaked at around 75-85% in 2022-2023 (with some estimates even higher), devastating household purchasing power ⁶. The Turkish lira lost significant value, and foreign reserves were depleted by efforts to defend the currency ¹⁵. By mid-2023, Türkiye faced its worst inflation in decades, undermining the AKP’s traditional claim to economic stewardship.

Reform Direction: After the 2023 elections, the government fortunately pivoted toward more orthodox economic management – a trend that must continue resolutely. President Mr. Erdoğan  appointed respected technocrats to lead the economy, signalling a return to “rational” policy. Notably, Mehmet Şimşek became Finance Minister in mid-2023 and immediately prioritised fighting inflation and stabilising the lira ¹⁶. Under his watch, the central bank reversed course and hiked interest rates drastically (from 8.5% before the election to 50% by April 2024) to rein in inflation expectations ^{16 15}. These moves, along with more restrained credit and currency intervention policies, have started to bear fruit: inflation has decelerated to about 38% as of March 2025, down from its peak of around 75% ⁶. International markets responded positively – Türkiye’s credit ratings outlook improved, risk spreads on bonds fell, and reserves modestly recovered ¹⁶. However, inflation remains far above the central bank’s target, and the adjustment has come at the cost of high interest rates and a slowdown in growth.

Recommendations: The AKP should empower its economic team to stay the course on orthodox monetary and fiscal policy until price stability is firmly re-established. As Şimşek noted, the government’s top priority must be a “permanent decrease in inflation” and they should not deviate from this program ⁶. In practice, this means:

• Allowing the central bank to maintain appropriately tight monetary policy (interest rates) until inflation is on a clear downward path to single digits. Political leaders must refrain from pressure to cut rates prematurely for short-term growth, as past experience showed that can reignite inflation and erode credibility. Indeed, Şimşek projects inflation could fall to around 24% by end-2025 with current policies ⁶ – achieving this will require consistency and resisting any election-eve populist splurges.
  
• Complementing monetary tightening with fiscal discipline. The government should trim unnecessary expenditures and target a lower budget deficit (the finance ministry already aims to reduce the deficit-to-GDP ratio to ~3% by 2025) ¹¹. With a high interest burden, fiscal prudence will also help contain demand-pull inflation. However, it’s important to protect social spending for the most vulnerable – targeted subsidies or support for low-income families can alleviate the pain of inflation and high interest rates. Essentially, the AKP must balance being seen as fiscally responsible with still caring for its base, many of whom are struggling with cost-of-living issues.
  
• Structural economic reforms to restore investor confidence for the long term. This includes improving the rule of law in economic affairs, strengthening institutions like the central bank’s independence, and enhancing transparency in government finances. Türkiye’s “overly dominant executive” and weakening of checks and balances in recent years have hurt its business climate ⁷. For example, concerns about judicial independence and contract enforcement have likely deterred some foreign investment ⁷. The AKP should enact legal reforms to reassure investors – such as revising public procurement processes to be more competitive and less prone to favouritism, and rebuilding statistical institutions’ credibility (so that inflation and growth data are trusted). Fighting corruption is also key (see Domestic Governance section below) for a healthier economy. The payoff to these reforms would be greater foreign capital inflows, job creation, and technological upgrading, which in turn can improve growth without stoking inflation.
  
• Export and investment promotion: The government’s economic strategy should pivot back to what helped Türkiye’s rise in the 2000s – encouraging exports, high-value industries, and foreign direct investment. A more stable lira and predictable policy environment will help; additionally, trade diplomacy (e.g. seeking an upgrade of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union to cover more sectors) could expand market access for Turkish goods. Investment in earthquake reconstruction and infrastructure, if done transparently, can also stimulate growth and employment. The key is to finance such projects sustainably, not via excessive money-printing or credit pumping, but through international partnerships and prudent borrowing, so as not to reignite inflation.
  

In short, maintaining economic orthodoxy and restoring credibility is non-negotiable for the AKP post-Mr. Erdoğan . The economic pain of the recent past has directly translated into political pain for the ruling party (many analysts attribute Mr. Erdoğan ’s local election losses partly to public anger over inflation) ⁴. To win back the urban middle classes and youth, the AKP must prove it can manage the economy competently without Mr. Erdoğan  micro-managing interest rates. If they deliver lower inflation and renewed prosperity by 2028, the party’s new leadership will have a far better chance of retaining power on their own merits.

Sustaining Political Power Without the “Mr. Erdoğan  Factor”

Challenge: Mr. Erdoğan ’s personal influence – his oratory, campaign charisma, and image as a strong leader – has been a glue binding the AKP’s coalition. Without him leading the ticket, the party risks losing a segment of voters who were voting for him rather than for the party or its policies. As noted, “Mr. Erdoğan ism without Mr. Erdoğan ” may not automatically inspire the same loyalty ². The AKP’s new leadership will have to find ways to maintain public support and internal cohesion absent their singular figurehead.

Recommendations: To maintain power in this new context, the AKP should pursue a two-pronged strategy: institutional strengthening and broad-based engagement.

• Strengthen Party Institutions and Collective Leadership: The AKP needs to evolve from a one-man-centric movement into a party that can thrive under collective leadership. This means bolstering internal party democracy and meritocracy to some extent – for instance, allowing more open competition in selecting candidates for offices and promoting competent younger politicians. Mr. Erdoğan ’s style was to concentrate decision-making in a tight circle; going forward, the party should empower a core team of credible figures (e.g. the new party chairman, key ministers, regional party barons) who can share the spotlight and jointly carry the party’s message. A more collegial leadership could mitigate the vacuum left by Mr. Erdoğan . It would also help manage rivalries: if everyone sees a role for themselves in a future AKP government (even without Mr. Erdoğan ), they have incentive to stick together. The worst outcome would be a splintering of the AKP into factions or breakaway parties. Investing in party unity through inclusive leadership and clear succession planning is thus critical. Mr. Erdoğan  can assist by publicly endorsing the next leader and perhaps stepping back to an honorary role when the time comes – allowing the new figure to shine.
  
• Message: Stability, Continuity of Governance, and Moderate Reform: The AKP should frame itself as the guarantor of stability during the transition. The pitch to voters in 2028 could be: “We delivered stability and growth after the 2023 crisis; we rebuilt after the 2023 earthquake; we kept the country on track – now we offer the same stability under new leadership, plus a fresh vision for the future.” Highlighting continuity (of AKP’s proven governance experience) combined with renewal (new faces, acknowledgement of past mistakes) can reassure voters. Notably, President Mr. Erdoğan ’s own acknowledgement after the local defeats that “if we made a mistake, we will fix it”⁴ is a line the party can build on. Concrete signals like removing notoriously corrupt or inefficient officials from positions, or reversing particularly unpopular policies, can show that the AKP is capable of self-correction. By modestly reforming itself, the party may convince some skeptics that keeping the AKP in power does not mean accepting all of Mr. Erdoğan ’s excesses forever. Essentially, they should retain the core achievements of the Mr. Erdoğan  era that many voters appreciate – infrastructure development, social aid programs, a more assertive national posture – while promising a softer, more accountable governing style going forward. This could win back moderate conservatives or undecided voters who admire AKP’s past work but grew wary of its recent authoritarian drift.
  
• Combatting Voter Fatigue and Opposition Appeal: After two decades, some segment of the electorate simply desires change. The opposition will campaign on offering a fresh start. To counter this, the AKP must convince the public that it too can represent change – just “change from within” rather than a risky leap into unknown opposition rule. Highlighting Mr. Erdoğan ’s legacy projects and promising to complete or maintain them could solidify loyalists, but equally important is addressing the younger generation’s aspirations. Türkiye’s youth in particular have been restless – a 2021 survey found 73% of young people wished to live abroad, citing economic woes, nepotism, and lack of meritocracy as reasons ⁸. This is a red flag for the AKP’s future voter base. The party should craft policies that speak to youth and educated professionals: for example, programs to boost youth employment (perhaps tech start-up incubators, or incentives for companies to hire fresh graduates), reforms to curb nepotism in hiring (making civil service exam processes more transparent and merit-based), and greater cultural and social freedoms to make young people feel heard. Even simple gestures like engaging youth leaders, holding town halls on university campuses, or using social media in a less propagandistic and more interactive way could slowly rebuild trust. If the AKP can show by deeds that talented young Turks have a future in their own country – not just the well-connected – it may slow the brain drain and undercut one of the opposition’s potent critiques.
  
• Leverage of Incumbency (Responsibly): Being in government does confer advantages that the AKP can use, though these must be balanced carefully to avoid backlash. The AKP still controls most media outlets and has influence over state institutions – while it should not abuse these (doing so could trigger public anger or even international criticism), it can ensure that its new leaders get adequate positive exposure. Government resources should be directed to visible public benefits in the run-up to elections: for instance, accelerating housing construction for earthquake victims, unveiling new transportation projects, or raising the minimum wage in line with inflation. These policies, if communicated well, remind voters that the AKP “gets things done.” That said, blatant electioneering – like handing out cash or appliances (a past practice) – might backfire in an era when citizens are acutely aware of economic trade-offs. It would be wiser to focus on substantive improvements that can be tied to the AKP’s governance competence.
  
• Avoiding Over-Reliance on Repression: Finally, while the AKP may be tempted to lean heavily on repression to stymie the opposition (as seen with İmamoğlu’s arrest), this is a double-edged sword. A strategy of jailing opponents, censoring dissent, or intimidating voters could ensure short-term control but at the cost of legitimacy and potentially stability. It risks galvanising the opposition further and alienating swing voters who dislike unfair tactics. The recommendation here is to enforce laws equitably and ensure any legal actions against opposition figures are on solid footing. If there are credible corruption cases, pursue them, but avoid the appearance of political witch-hunts. Moreover, the AKP should consider opening some space in the political arena – for example, allowing more fair competition in the media and pledging to respect election results. A managed relaxation of authoritarian measures could actually strengthen the AKP’s hand by improving its image and reducing the opposition’s rallying cries. In essence, the AKP can aim to win “clean enough” that its victory is accepted, which is crucial for governing a polarised society.
  
  

In summary, maintaining power without Mr. Erdoğan  will require the AKP to transform from a one-man show into a party that stands on a record of governance and a promise of steady hands. By institutionalising leadership, re-engaging disillusioned demographics, continuing to deliver services, and moderating its hardline tendencies, the AKP can improve its odds of extending its rule democratically. The goal should be to present the 2028 election not as a referendum on Mr. Erdoğan ’s legacy (which could unify the opposition), but as a choice about Türkiye’s future – in which a refreshed AKP can still claim to be the most capable steward.

Recalibrating Regional Diplomacy and Great-Power Relations

Under Mr. Erdoğan ’s assertive foreign policy, Türkiye has often been at odds with neighbours and allies alike – pursuing a mix of confrontational and cooperative stances that some call “muscular” or Neo-Ottoman diplomacy ¹⁴. A post-Mr. Erdoğan  government led by the AKP will inherit these complex relationships. To maintain Türkiye’s regional influence and economic interests, the next leadership should continue strategic engagement but with a less combative tone. Key areas include:

• Relations with Syria: Türkiye’s policy toward Syria is at a turning point. The long-standing goal of ousting Bashar al-Assad has given way to pragmatism as Assad remains in power and millions of Syrian refugees reside in Türkiye. In recent years, Ankara has shown openness to normalizing ties with Damascus if it serves Türkiye’s interests – principally, the return of refugees and containment of Kurdish separatist groups (the YPG/PKK) in northern Syria ^{17 18}. Russian mediation led to initial talks in 2022-2023 between Turkish and Syrian officials ¹⁹. President Mr. Erdoğan  even stated in mid-2024 that he could invite Assad for a meeting “at any time”¹⁹. However, progress has been slow; Assad demands Türkiye withdraw troops from Syrian territory, while Türkiye insists on security guarantees regarding Kurdish militias ¹⁹.
  • Recommendation: The AKP should pursue a carefully negotiated detente with Damascus, in coordination with Russia (and Qatar or other stakeholders), aiming for a deal that allows the voluntary repatriation of a substantial number of Syrian refugees and curbs the Kurdish armed presence near the Turkish border. This might involve Türkiye gradually reducing its military footprint in northwest Syria in exchange for Syrian regime and Russian commitments to clamp down on the PKK-aligned factions and to facilitate safe zones or reconstruction incentives for returning refugees. While a full friendship with Assad may never be possible (given the bloodshed and mistrust), a cold peace could benefit Türkiye by easing the refugee burden – a hot domestic issue – and improving border security. Domestically, any such accord must be messaged not as abandoning Syria’s opposition but as prioritising Türkiye’s national interest and humanitarian situation. If handled transparently, the Turkish public may accept normalization; polls have shown growing fatigue with hosting refugees and a desire for resolution. Additionally, by resolving issues with Assad, Türkiye can pre-empt the opposition’s criticism that the AKP’s Syria policy caused unnecessary entanglement.
    
• Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean: Tensions with Greece (and by extension Cyprus and the EU) have flared repeatedly in the past decade over maritime boundaries, energy exploration, airspace, and the status of islands. Under Mr. Erdoğan , Türkiye adopted an assertive stance, sending drill ships into disputed waters and issuing fiery rhetoric. Yet, there have also been thaws – notably the “earthquake diplomacy” after Türkiye’s devastating February 2023 quake, when Greece was quick to send aid and condolences ²⁰. Since then, both sides have shown interest in a reset. In late 2023, Mr. Erdoğan  and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met and agreed to shelve contentious issues for a period, focusing instead on positive agenda items like trade, tourism, and disaster cooperation ³.
  • Recommendation: The AKP leadership should continue this détente with Greece. Confidence-building measures – such as reviving military-to-military dialogues to avoid Aegean incidents, and perhaps quietly pausing provocative exploration in contested waters while diplomatic talks proceed – will reduce the risk of an accidental clash. A concrete step would be to formally revive exploratory talks on the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, which were suspended amid tensions. Even if a full agreement is far off, keeping the dialogue alive helps manage the disputes. The goal should be to maintain the “positive track” of relations ²¹ at least until after both countries’ election cycles, creating a calmer environment. Improved Türkiye-Greece ties also help Türkiye’s broader relationship with the European Union, which had sanctioned Türkiye over Eastern Med tensions. If Türkiye can show it is resolving issues with EU member Greece (and also refrain from new moves on Cyprus that upset the status quo), it stands to gain goodwill in Brussels. That could translate into progress on updating the Customs Union or on other cooperative projects. In essence, a less confrontational approach in the Aegean and Mediterranean will benefit Türkiye’s economy (through more trade and energy partnerships) and undermine the opposition’s claims that AKP’s foreign policy isolated Türkiye.
    
• EU and the West: Türkiye’s EU accession process is moribund, largely due to Mr. Erdoğan ’s democratic backsliding and disputes with certain EU members. While full membership is off the table in the near term, Türkiye still deeply relies on Europe for trade, investment, and technology. The AKP should therefore seek a pragmatic relationship with the EU: push for modernization of the 1995 Customs Union (to include digital trade, services, etc.), which could boost Türkiye’s GDP, and pursue visa liberalization for Turkish citizens (a long-standing public wish). The EU has hinted these are possible if Türkiye meets certain conditions such as improving rule of law and data protection. A post-Mr. Erdoğan  AKP could capitalize on a “new chapter” narrative – enacting some judicial reforms, releasing a few high-profile political prisoners, or aligning with certain EU norms – to unlock these benefits. Even small positive steps could lead to renewed EU financial aid or inclusion of Türkiye in European initiatives (like Green Deal investments or migration burden-sharing). Another area is NATO: Türkiye under AKP should reinforce its commitment to the alliance. The contentious issue of Sweden’s NATO membership was resolved by early 2024 with Türkiye’s ratification ^{23 24}. Now, the AKP can use that goodwill to lobby Washington for the promised sale of F-16 fighter jet upgrades, which the U.S. signaled after the Sweden issue was settled ²⁴. Securing the F-16 deal and possibly new defence partnerships with the U.S. would strengthen Türkiye’s security and its Western alignment, even as it maintains ties with Russia. Overall, a post-Mr. Erdoğan  AKP should emphasize that Türkiye remains a reliable Western partner – this will undercut Western enthusiasm for a change in Turkish government, and ensure Türkiye isn’t economically isolated. It’s a way of hedging: if the West is less concerned about Türkiye’s trajectory, the AKP gains more international breathing room to govern at home.
  
• Russia: Under Mr. Erdoğan , Türkiye perfected a balancing act with Russia – cooperating in some areas (energy, defense industry, Syria diplomacy) while opposing in others (e.g., military support to Ukraine, not recognising Crimea’s annexation). This “strategic compartmentalisation” should largely continue, as Russia is too important for Türkiye’s energy needs, tourism, and regional influence to antagonise. The AKP should maintain open lines with Moscow: continuing joint projects like the Akkuyu nuclear plant and gas trade, and perhaps mediating in conflicts (Türkiye played a key role in the Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine in 2022). However, a new Turkish leadership might also recalibrate slightly to reassure the West – for instance, more diligently enforcing sanctions on Russia to avoid fallout on Turkish banks or companies, now that the immediate economic crisis has eased. The key is not to become overly dependent on Russia economically (which could happen if Western capital stays away). Türkiye should diversify energy sources and routes (resume talks on Eastern Med gas via Türkiye or increase Azerbaijani imports) so that Russia’s leverage is reduced. In any case, the recommendation is for “proactive balance”: remain a dialogue partner to Putin, avoid direct confrontation, but also avoid appearing as Russia’s enabler in evading sanctions or aggression. This balanced stance has served Türkiye well in giving it a mediator aura and preventing any one bloc from having undue leverage over Ankara.
  
• Regional Powers (Middle East): The AKP government in recent years already initiated a reconciliation trend with Middle Eastern rivals – mending ties with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt after periods of tension. These efforts paid off in investment and diplomatic support (for example, Gulf investments shored up Türkiye’s Forex reserves in 2022-23). The post-Mr. Erdoğan’s policy should continue this trajectory of “zero problems” with regional heavyweights. Specifically, deepening economic ties with the Gulf states (through investment deals, sovereign fund arrangements, or defense exports) can help Türkiye’s economy. With Israel, continuing intelligence and security cooperation quietly, while publicly maintaining support for Palestinian rights, will allow Türkiye to be a player in the Eastern Med without open hostilities. In the South Caucasus, Türkiye should keep supporting Azerbaijan but also consider outreach to Armenia (perhaps reopening transport links fully) to build peace and trade – something the EU and U.S. would welcome. Each of these relationships should be managed with the awareness that Türkiye’s regional clout increases when it is on speaking terms with all sides. That also leaves less room for the opposition to claim the AKP isolated Türkiye.
  

In summary, a post-Mr. Erdoğan  AKP foreign policy needs to pivot from the often brash, personalised style of Mr. Erdoğan  to a steadier, more predictable diplomacy. This doesn’t mean abandoning Türkiye’s interests or accepting a submissive role – rather, it means pursuing those interests through negotiation, alliances, and international law more than through unilateral shows of force. Such an approach will safeguard Türkiye’s regional stature, keep the peace on its borders, and support the crucial economic recovery by reducing geopolitical risk. It will also deprive the opposition of easy targets (for instance, it’s harder to rally people against the government when it is successfully making peace rather than causing crises). In the long run, regional stability will reinforce domestic stability, which only helps the AKP stay in power.

Addressing Domestic Unrest, Youth Disillusionment, and Institutional Decay

Challenge: Beyond the high politics of elections and foreign relations, the AKP must confront serious domestic issues that have been eroding the social contract. Public frustration has grown over declining living standards, corruption scandals, a perceived erosion of justice and meritocracy, and the heavy-handed suppression of dissent. Young people, in particular, feel alienated – many see little future in Türkiye’s current climate of economic precarity and curtailed freedoms, leading to an exodus of talent ⁸. Periodic eruptions of protest (from the 2013 Gezi Park protests to more recent demonstrations over university appointments or the İstanbul mayor’s arrest) show that discontent simmers under the surface. If left unaddressed, these social pressures could explode, threatening stability and undermining the AKP’s legitimacy. Moreover, Türkiye’s state institutions – the judiciary, law enforcement, regulatory bodies – have been politicised and weakened after years of what some analysts term “strategic legalism” by the ruling party ⁷. Reversing institutional decay is not only important for democracy but also for effective governance (for instance, the tragic collapse of buildings in the 2023 earthquake was linked to corruption in building codes enforcement ⁷).

Recommendations: To ensure long-term stability and win back the confidence of segments of society currently disillusioned, the AKP should implement reforms to make governance cleaner, more participatory, and more just:

• Anti-Corruption and Transparency Measures: Türkiye’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has plummeted to its lowest ever – 115th out of 180 countries, with a score of just 34/100 in 2023 ⁷. TI directly attributes this decline to an “overly dominant executive” and weak checks and balances, with corruption norms unenforced and judicial independence lacking ⁷. The AKP should take this criticism seriously. Concrete steps could include strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission (or creating an independent ombudsman) to investigate graft allegations, even within the ruling party’s ranks. Enforcing procurement laws to prevent sweetheart deals, and prosecuting a few high-profile corruption cases (even if they involve politically connected individuals), would signal a new commitment to clean governance. Importantly, this can be framed as Mr. Erdoğan ’s legacy prompting a clean-up: for instance, say “to honour Mr. Erdoğan ’s achievements, we must ensure no corruption tarnishes them going forward.” Reducing corruption isn’t just morally right; it would likely improve economic efficiency and public trust. The government can also leverage technology – e-government portals for public services can reduce petty bribery opportunities and increase citizen satisfaction by making interactions with bureaucracy more transparent and efficient.
  
• Rebuilding Institutions and Rule of Law: A critical area is the judiciary. The AKP should enact reforms to ensure judges and prosecutors operate without political interference. While full judicial independence might be hard to restore overnight (given the extensive reshuffling of judges after the 2016 coup attempt), steps like implementing objective criteria for judicial appointments, strengthening the Constitutional Court’s role as a check on executive overreach, and complying with European Court of Human Rights rulings would all help. For example, releasing figures like philanthropist Osman Kavala or former HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş, in line with court decisions, would remove thorny issues and show a break from the past approach. These moves could ease EU tensions and also domestic Kurdish unrest, respectively. The AKP might worry that a freer judiciary could target its members – hence, they could sequence reforms carefully, perhaps initially focusing on administrative and economic areas of law to build credibility, then gradually depoliticise criminal justice. A stronger rule of law will help address grievances from various groups – whether it’s Kurds wanting fair treatment, or businesses wanting impartial contract enforcement.
  
• Engaging Youth and Intellectuals: To tackle youth disillusionment, policies must go beyond economics. Young Turks often cite lack of freedom and merit as reasons for wanting to leave ⁸. The AKP can take relatively low-cost steps to show it values the youth’s voice. For instance, revoke or revise the controversial social media law that was seen as censorship – instead, collaborate with civil society on a balanced approach to online content. Allow universities more autonomy in electing their rectors (the 2021 protests at Boğaziçi University erupted when an AKP-appointed rector was installed, seen as violating academic freedom). If the government enabled a transparent, merit-based selection of university leaders, it would earn goodwill among students and faculty. Additionally, promoting cultural and creative industries could appeal to younger demographics – for example, easing restrictions on music festivals or arts events that had been occasionally banned on conservative grounds. A society that lets its youth blow off steam and pursue creativity will be more at peace. The AKP could also consider establishing youth councils or advisory boards at local and national levels, integrating young people into policy making on issues like climate change, digital economy, etc. This gives youths a stake in the system. Finally, addressing the education-to-employment pipeline is key: expanding vocational training, coding bootcamps, and internship programs can help graduates find jobs on merit, not connections, and thereby chip away at the culture of nepotism that 64% of Turkish young people identified as a top problem ⁸.
  
• Managing Dissent Peacefully: In recent years, the government’s reflex to protests has been heavy-handed – riot police crackdowns, mass arrests, and prosecuting demonstrators (as with Gezi in 2013, or more recently environmental protests). A more nuanced approach is advised. The Interior Ministry should train police in de-escalation and set rules of engagement that prioritize dialogue with peaceful demonstrators. Perhaps designate legal protest zones in big cities, so that people feel they can express dissent without immediately being treated as criminals. By tolerating a certain level of peaceful protest and criticism, the AKP can actually defuse tensions; when people feel heard, they are less likely to radicalize or cause disruption. Moreover, it deprives the opposition of martyrs and symbols of oppression. There is historical precedent in Türkiye for this – in the early AKP years, the government was relatively more permissive of dissent, which helped its democratic image. Returning to that spirit (even partially) could ease societal polarization.
  
• Kurdish Issue and Inclusivity: Domestic unrest in Türkiye is often tied to the Kurdish issue – a significant portion of the “domestic terrorism” or insurgency problem, as well as political strife (e.g., the closure of pro-Kurdish parties, imprisonment of Kurdish politicians). Mr. Erdoğan  famously attempted a peace process with the PKK in 2013-2015 which ultimately failed, but it showed that progress is possible. A post-Mr. Erdoğan  AKP might actually have an opportunity here: a new leader with less baggage could reach out again to Kurdish communities with confidence-building steps. Recommendations include reinstating Kurdish language rights in education and media (which had seen setbacks), ending the practice of replacing elected Kurdish mayors with state-appointed trustees absent clear evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and perhaps exploring a decentralised governance model that gives all localities (not just Kurdish-majority ones) more say in their affairs. This way it’s framed not as a concession to Kurds alone, but as a general democratisation that benefits everyone. Additionally, as hinted by MHP leader Bahçeli’s surprising suggestion about Öcalan, there might even be space to negotiate an end to the PKK insurgency if approached cleverly ⁵. Any such step would be controversial but transformative. Even short of that, healing the Kurdish-Turkish divide by political means rather than securitized means will reduce unrest and remove a major rallying point the opposition could use against the government.
  

In tackling these domestic issues, the AKP should remember that legitimacy at home is the foundation of power. Mr. Erdoğan ’s legacy has been tarnished among some by allegations of corruption and authoritarianism; his successors can differentiate themselves by showing a reformist streak that strengthens institutions and includes more citizens in governance. These reforms are not purely altruistic – they are insurance for stability. As the shocking February 2023 earthquake illustrated, corruption and institutional failure can literally cost lives and then lead to public fury ⁷ . By combating these ills, the AKP can reduce the likelihood of unrest and the appeal of revolutionary change. A cleaner, fairer system under their watch could convince skeptical citizens that continuity with improvement is better than a risky opposition-led upheaval.

Mr. Erdoğan’s Legacy and Possible Post-Government Roles

President Erdoğan’s legacy will undoubtedly loom large over Türkiye’s future – he has, for better or worse, reshaped the country more than any leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ¹⁴. He modernised infrastructure, empowered a conservative middle class, and asserted Türkiye’s independent voice on the world stage ¹⁴. At the same time, he is widely criticised for democratic backsliding – concentrating power, eroding checks and balances, and using the judiciary to sideline opponents ¹⁴. This dual legacy means that when Mr. Erdoğan  leaves office, the question of his post-government role is complex. Will he act as a benign elder statesman or a power behind the throne? Could he face legal repercussions for past actions? Or will he withdraw from politics entirely? Here we explore several scenarios, each with precedent in other countries:

1. Kingmaker in the Wings: Mr. Erdoğan  could remain active in guiding Turkish politics behind the scenes, especially if the AKP stays in power. One model is Russia’s Boris Yeltsin, who, upon resigning, ensured his chosen successor (Vladimir Putin) protected him and his family from prosecution ¹⁰. In Türkiye’s context, Mr. Erdoğan  might step down from the presidency but retain a formal or informal leadership position – for example, remaining as AKP Chairman or assuming an honorary title. With his vast experience and personal networks, he could mentor the new president and government. This arrangement might resemble Kazakhstan’s scenario after 2019, when Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned as president but initially kept significant powers as “Leader of the Nation” and chair of the national security council. In Türkiye, there is no legal “supreme leader” role, but Mr. Erdoğan ’s continued presence as party leader or a senior adviser could amount to something similar. The benefit of this scenario for Mr. Erdoğan  is security: he could negotiate immunity or at least non-interference in his personal affairs, as Yeltsin did (Putin’s first act was granting Yeltsin immunity from prosecution) ¹⁰. For the AKP, this keeps the old base comfortable – they know “Başkan Mr. Erdoğan ” is still around to consult. However, the drawbacks include possible friction with the new president (dual centres of power can breed conflict) and public skepticism about whether anything has truly changed. Also, any commitment to legal immunity might not sit well with the opposition or parts of society that demand accountability.
   
2. Ceremonial Elder Statesman: Mr. Erdoğan  might choose a quieter post-presidency, refraining from day-to-day politics but remaining a symbolic figure. Perhaps he could focus on philanthropic or pan-Islamic causes, leveraging his stature in the Muslim world. Domestically, he could be honored as an elder – akin to how some former Turkish presidents like Abdullah Gül or Ahmet Necdet Sezer generally stepped back. There is also Türkiye’s tradition of former presidents becoming members of the Constitutional Court’s consultative assembly (a provision in earlier constitutions, though its current applicability is unclear). If Mr. Erdoğan  took on a ceremonial role, it could ease tensions – signaling a generational transition while preserving his dignity. He might occasionally offer public advice or represent Türkiye at certain events, but not interfere in routine governance. This path would require a level of restraint that Mr. Erdoğan  hasn’t often shown, but it could burnish his legacy in hindsight as someone who knew when to exit. The public might come to view him as the “father of New Türkiye” who oversaw a peaceful transition. For this to work, he would likely need assurances (again, legal safety and respect) and the personal willingness to let others steer the ship.
   
3. Legal Challenges and Accountability: A less favourable scenario for Mr. Erdoğan  is facing legal troubles after leaving power. This is not uncommon in democracies – in South Korea, for example, nearly every former president in recent memory has been prosecuted (and often jailed) for corruption after their term. In Argentina, Carlos Menem, after leaving the presidency in 1999, was investigated and even convicted for illegal arms trafficking and embezzlement, though he avoided prison due to immunity as a senator ²⁶. In Türkiye, opposition voices have vowed to investigate AKP-era corruption and authoritarian abuses if they gain power ²⁴. Possible charges could range from corruption in construction contracts to human rights violations (like the jailing of thousands after the 2016 coup attempt). If the opposition were to win in 2028, Mr. Erdoğan  could indeed face trial – much as happened to the previous long-ruling Turkish leader Adnan Menderes, who was tried (and tragically executed) after a 1960 coup, or to military rulers like Kenan Evren who were tried in their old age for the 1980 coup. However, if the AKP remains in control, they are very unlikely to allow their patriarch to be humiliated with court cases. They may pass legislation to protect former presidents (similar to how Russia passed a law granting ex-presidents lifetime immunity ²⁵). Already, current law in Türkiye provides that parliament must approve any trial of a president for crimes committed in office, which won’t happen under AKP majority.
   • Recommendation: The best course for stability would be to avoid a polarizing prosecution of Mr. Erdoğan, unless extremely egregious crimes demand it. A negotiated understanding (even a quiet deal with opposition figures) to let Mr. Erdoğan  retire peacefully abroad or in Istanbul, in exchange for him gracefully exiting, could spare Türkiye a divisive spectacle. That said, the public’s demand for justice must be balanced – perhaps truth commissions or parliamentary inquiries could examine controversial episodes (like the 2013 corruption probe or the handling of the 2016 coup aftermath) without directly jailing Mr. Erdoğan . Menem’s case offers a lesson: he was indeed convicted, but political deals kept him free ²⁶, and he lived out his life as a polarizing but free man ²⁶. Mr. Erdoğan  might similarly remain a controversial figure but not behind bars, if that’s what it takes to move the country forward.
     
4. Complete Withdrawal (Retirement): Lastly, Mr. Erdoğan  might simply step away from politics entirely, due to age or health. He is currently 69 and would be 74 by 2028; he has had some health scares (public appearances canceled, etc., fuelling rumours) ². It’s conceivable he may decide – or be forced by health – to spend his later years out of the public eye. Perhaps he could relocate to a friendly country part-time (there were rumours in the past of Mr. Erdoğan  having close ties in Qatar, for example). In this scenario, Mr. Erdoğan  would neither direct politics nor be hauled into court; he would effectively close the book on his career. The upside is it allows new leaders to emerge without his shadow. The downside, for AKP hardliners, is losing the galvanising “chief” entirely, which could demoralise some followers. For the nation, a quiet retirement might actually be a relief, lowering the political temperature and humanising a leader who had become larger-than-life. Mr. Erdoğan  could write memoirs, reflecting on his journey from humble roots to presidency – shaping how history remembers him. Given his ego and drive, this scenario may be least likely unless compelled by circumstance. But it is not impossible; many authoritarian-leaning leaders (like Chile’s Pinochet or Indonesia’s Suharto) eventually left the scene in their old age and spent their final years withdrawn from daily affairs.
   

In reality, Mr. Erdoğan ’s post-presidency path might combine elements of these scenarios. For instance, he might initially attempt a kingmaker role but gradually fade into ceremonial status. It will also depend on the context of his departure – a voluntary retirement after term limits is different from an electoral defeat. If Mr. Erdoğan  feels secure that his legacy and person are protected, he’s more likely to go gently. The AKP can facilitate this by ensuring legal immunities (maybe passing a law that ex-Presidents get a Senate seat or advisory role with immunity). They could also orchestrate a grand send-off, framing him as a national hero stepping down for the good of democracy, which might pave the way for him to stay above the fray afterwards.

From a policy perspective, the recommendation to the AKP here is: manage Mr. Erdoğan ’s exit gracefully and leverage his legacy positively, while freeing the new leadership to govern. That means honouring him (to satisfy loyalists) but not letting him obstruct necessary changes. Mr. Erdoğan ’s presence could still be an asset if used in moderation – for example, he could be deployed for diplomatic missions where his personal rapport (say, with certain world leaders) is useful. But day-to-day, the new administration should have its own authority.

A final consideration on legacy is how Mr. Erdoğan  himself might influence it. Leaders often think about how history will judge them. Mr. Erdoğan  likely wants to be remembered alongside Atatürk as a transformative figure. That may incline him to avoid a chaotic end. Perhaps he might even initiate a constitutional reform to create an upper house or some council of state for elders, positioning himself there – a move that could be spun as enhancing Türkiye’s democracy by adding more consultation. If done transparently, some may accept it.

Overall, Mr. Erdoğan ’s legacy will remain divisive – millions revere him for giving them pride and voice, while millions others revile him for undermining democracy and economic mismanagement in later years. How he exits will significantly shape that legacy. A peaceful, constitutional transition in which he abides by the rules could partially rehabilitate his image internationally and set a precedent in the region. Conversely, any attempt to cling to power extra-legally (for instance, trying to override term limits without consensus) would likely tarnish his legacy irreparably and risk instability. Thus, the preferable path – for both Mr. Erdoğan  and Türkiye – is an orderly departure where he consents to the constitutional limit, helps his party adjust, and then steps back at least semi-gracefully. This would cement him as a statesman in Türkiye’s story, not just a strongman.

Lessons from Other Post-Strongman Transitions

Türkiye’s upcoming transition is not unique – many countries have faced the question of what happens after a dominant leader leaves the scene. While every nation’s circumstances differ, there are instructive parallels and cautionary tales. Here we compare and extract lessons from two notable cases mentioned: Russia after Yeltsin, and Argentina after Menem, as well as brief insights from others, to better understand potential trajectories for Türkiye after Mr. Erdoğan .

• Russia after Yeltsin (1999-2000): Boris Yeltsin was not an authoritarian in the classic sense, but he was a towering figure who led Russia through the chaotic 1990s. By 1999, ill health and dwindling popularity pushed him to an abrupt New Year’s Eve resignation. Crucially, Yeltsin handpicked Vladimir Putin, an obscure security official, as his successor and secured promises that he and his family would be shielded from any retribution ¹⁰. Indeed, one of Putin’s first acts as Acting President was to sign a decree granting Yeltsin total immunity from prosecution for any acts during his presidency ¹⁰. In return, Putin gained Yeltsin’s endorsement and the advantages of incumbency going into the 2000 election, which he won handily ²⁷. The result was a continuity of the ruling elite but with a significant change in governance style: Putin re-centralised power even more, cracked down on oligarchs and dissent, and reversed many democratic gains.
  • Lesson for Türkiye: If the AKP manages a similar handover – selecting a loyal successor who can win election and protect Mr. Erdoğan  – the ruling structure can persist. However, the Russian case also warns that the successor might govern in a more authoritarian fashion to cement control (as Putin did), which could lead Türkiye further away from democracy. The Russia example highlights the importance of the deal between outgoing and incoming leadership. For Türkiye, a clear understanding (whether tacit or formal) between Mr. Erdoğan  and his successor regarding immunity and influence could prevent internal splits and instability. On the flip side, it could also mean a perpetuation of the same system under a new face, delaying democratisation. Another lesson is that choosing a capable successor matters: Yeltsin chose someone with security apparatus backing and a tough image, which ensured regime survival. Mr. Erdoğan  may similarly prefer a successor with strong security or nationalist credentials to keep the state establishment on their side. But, as in Russia, that could come at the cost of an even harder turn from liberal democracy (Putin arguably outdid Yeltsin in authoritarian methods).
    
• Argentina after Menem (1999-2003): Carlos Menem served two terms as Argentina’s president (1989-1999), presiding over significant economic changes (free-market reforms and a currency peg) and also considerable corruption. Barred from a third consecutive term, Menem stepped down, and an opposition candidate (Fernando de la Rúa) won the 1999 election. The transition initially was democratic and normal. However, Argentina soon plunged into a severe economic crisis (the 2001 default and depression), which led to de la Rúa’s resignation and a period of chaos where several presidents rotated in mere weeks. By 2003, Menem attempted a comeback in the presidential race. He led the first round but, facing sure defeat in the runoff, he withdrew, allowing his rival Néstor Kirchner (from Menem’s Peronist party but a reformist wing) to assume the presidency ²⁶. Menem’s legacy by then was largely discredited – his policies were seen as having set the stage for the collapse, and he was dogged by legal problems. He was charged and even convicted for corruption (illegal arms sales, embezzlement), receiving prison sentences, though he avoided jail by using his position as a senator to claim immunity ²⁶. Public opinion on Menem remained polarised until his death in 2021, with many blaming him for the economic meltdown.
  • Lesson for Türkiye: Argentina’s case underscores how a ruling party’s loss of power can lead to instability if the successors cannot manage the inherited problems. Should the AKP lose in the next election, the opposition will inherit a high inflation economy and institutional weaknesses – if they falter, as de la Rúa did, the public might sour on them quickly. In Argentina, the Peronist party (Menem’s party) returned to power with Kirchner and has dominated since, despite Menem’s tarnished name. For the AKP, this suggests that even if they lose once, they could come back if the new government fails – but that’s a risky bet that involves national suffering in the interim. Another lesson is personal legal peril: Menem’s fate shows ex-leaders can face years of court battles. Menem protected himself by becoming a senator, analogous to how Mr. Erdoğan  might seek parliamentary immunity or a similar shield. Argentina also demonstrates the importance of economic stewardship: leaving a mess for one’s successors (as Menem’s fixed peso regime did) can lead to not only social unrest but also an eventual vindication of the old guard in a twisted way (because people remember the relative stability of the earlier years). Thus, the AKP should aim to resolve as much of Türkiye’s economic troubles now – so that if the opposition wins, they do not inherit a ticking time bomb that could blow up and pave the way for an AKP return via public disillusionment (which would be traumatic for the country).
    
• Other Examples: While not explicitly requested, brief mention of other cases can enrich the analysis. In Kazakhstan after Nazarbayev (2019-present), the longtime president resigned but kept a behind-the-scenes role, similar to scenario 1 for Mr. Erdoğan . Initially it seemed smooth, but by 2022, public unrest led the new president (Tokayev) to strip Nazarbayev of remaining powers – a reminder that successors, once secure, may not forever defer to the predecessor. This warns Mr. Erdoğan  that even an anointed successor could eventually chart an independent path (loyalty in authoritarian settings is never guaranteed long-term). In Malaysia after Mahathir (2003), the strongman voluntarily retired and allowed a chosen successor, who then implemented more liberal policies and was very popular initially – until Mahathir himself decided the successor was weak and came out of retirement to oppose him. This oscillation shows the temptation of a retired strongman to meddle if he dislikes the new direction. Mr. Erdoğan  would need the discipline to avoid undermining his replacement. Spain after Franco (1975), though a different context (dictatorship to democracy), illustrates how a regime’s insiders can manage a peaceful transition to a new system – King Juan Carlos, entrusted by Franco, chose to democratize Spain, surprising many. If a trusted AKP figure took steps to liberalize Türkiye after Mr. Erdoğan  (perhaps seeing it as necessary for stability), it would parallel that. However, that requires foresight and willingness to diminish one’s own power for the country’s good.
  

Summary of Lessons: Successful post-strongman transitions often require a blend of guarantees for the exiting leader (to ensure they go willingly), a clear successor to maintain continuity (to avoid power vacuums), and some openness to change (to address why a change was needed and placate public demand for reform). Russia achieved continuity but not much positive change; Argentina got change (new leadership, different policies) but at the cost of short-term chaos and eventually a partial return of the old establishment. The ideal for Türkiye would be to secure continuity and stability, while making enough changes to prevent crisis. Additionally, ensuring the outgoing leader’s dignity and security (perhaps via immunity and respect) can avoid a fight-to-the-death scenario. Lastly, these examples stress that transitions are processes, not events – the years immediately after the handover are critical in determining whether the system truly stabilises or not. Türkiye’s policymakers should therefore plan not just for the day Mr. Erdoğan  leaves office, but for how to govern in the years after, when comparisons to him will be constant and the new leadership must step out of his shadow.

Strategic Conclusion: Navigating the Path Forward

As Türkiye stands on the cusp of the post-Mr. Erdoğan  era, the overriding priority for the ruling AKP should be to maintain national stability and their political viability through a prudent, forward-looking strategy. The analysis above yields several core guidelines for decision-makers:

1. Manage the Succession with Unity and Legitimacy: The AKP must turn the potential crisis of Mr. Erdoğan ’s exit into an orderly succession. This involves coalescing around a successor early, with Mr. Erdoğan ’s explicit endorsement, to prevent internal fractures ². That successor must be prepared to lead the party into the 2028 elections on their own merit, campaigning on the AKP’s record and future vision rather than simply Mr. Erdoğan ’s past. By proactively organising a leadership transition – perhaps through an extraordinary party congress or a staged elevation of a vice-president – the AKP can present a united front. The process should be as transparent and merit-based as possible to lend the new leader legitimacy. Avoid backroom power struggles that would spill into public view and erode confidence. Instead, demonstrate continuity: show that Mr. Erdoğan ’s team and values persist, but also signal renewal: the new leader brings a fresh energy and will address past shortcomings. This balance is key to convincing voters that they can trust the AKP post-Mr. Erdoğan . Unity within the AKP and its alliance (MHP and others) is equally vital – reach out to allies and even estranged former AKP figures to broaden support. An inclusive approach now can prevent defections and maybe even lure back some splinters, bolstering the coalition.

2. Deliver Economic Relief and Competence: Economic performance will be the make-or-break factor in retaining public support. The AKP should stay the course on stabilising the economy – keep inflation on a downward trajectory, even if that means short-term pain via high interest rates ⁶. Clearly communicate to the public that these policies are yielding results (e.g., publish regular updates of price indices, emphasize falling inflation from its peak of 75% to closer to 20% as projected ⁶). At the same time, mitigate the social impact: consider targeted subsidies or tax breaks for basic goods to help families cope until inflation normalises. Acknowledge people’s hardship empathetically; a bit of humility and understanding from AKP officials can rebuild trust. Focus on job creation through infrastructure projects and incentivizing industries – especially in the earthquake-hit regions, massive reconstruction can both do good and provide employment. By 2028, aim to show tangible improvements: a lira that’s more stable, an inflation rate under control, and positive growth that translates into jobs. If the average Turk feels the economy has turned a corner under AKP stewardship, they will be less inclined to vote for uncertainty with the opposition. The message is “we fixed the economy we once struggled with – don’t hand it to novices.” Importantly, institutionalise this competence: strengthen the central bank’s credibility and make it known that under new AKP leadership there won’t be a return to reckless policies. Continuity of the respected economic team (Şimşek and others) into the next administration would assure markets and voters alike.

3. Implement Visible Good Governance Reforms: To preempt opposition critiques and appeal to the middle ground, the AKP should enact a slate of governance reforms in the next few years. This is a strategic move to detoxify the party’s image among skeptics. Start with anti-corruption steps that are highly visible – for instance, require ministers and MPs to declare assets publicly, and empower the Court of Accounts (Türkiye’s auditor) to fully audit all public expenditures with results made public. Crack down on nepotism: perhaps issue an internal AKP directive banning the hiring of relatives in key government positions, or at least subjecting such hires to review. While enforcement may be imperfect, the signal that the AKP hears the public on this issue is crucial ⁸. On rule of law, even limited moves like allowing a few high-profile political cases to resolve according to court judgements (e.g., abiding by a Constitutional Court or ECHR decision to release a prisoner) would mark a departure from defiance. Additionally, consider reviving the reformist spirit of early AKP years by engaging the EU on judicial and rights reforms – not because the EU demands it, but because Turkish citizens deserve it. Such reforms can undercut the opposition’s rallying cries about democracy. Essentially, steal the opposition’s thunder by addressing some of the legitimate grievances. When election time comes, the AKP can then say, “We heard you and improved; we are not the same as five years ago. Why switch to an untested coalition when we are already delivering change from within?”

4. Pursue a Foreign Policy of Balance and Reduced Tensions: Strategically, the AKP should ensure that foreign entanglements do not upset domestic stability or the election calculus. This means, in the run-up to the transition and beyond, avoid major international crises. Continue normalizing ties where possible – with Greece and Armenia by sticking to diplomatic talks ³, with regional powers by deepening economic cooperation, and with Western allies by being a team player in NATO (as shown by finally approving Sweden’s membership) ²³. A calm external environment is conducive to economic recovery (tourism, trade, investment all flow better when Türkiye isn’t in confrontation). It also deprives the opposition of issues like “he’s isolating the country.” On the contrary, if the AKP can go into 2028 saying “we brought peace with neighbours, opened new markets, and kept Türkiye respected globally,” that’s a vote-winner. A critical piece is managing the Syria situation – progress on refugee return or counter terrorism via diplomacy can be showcased as solving a problem that affects ordinary Turks (who often cite Syrian refugees as a concern). Similarly, securing the F-16 deal with the U.S. and perhaps even discussing upgrades to Türkiye’s customs deal with the EU can be spun as AKP’s diplomatic skill benefiting citizens (more security, more jobs). In summary, a foreign policy focused on pragmatic gains rather than ideological posturing will support domestic stability and bolster the AKP’s narrative of effective governance.

5. Ensure a Dignified Exit for Mr. Erdoğan  while Moving Forward: Finally, the AKP’s strategy must include handling Mr. Erdoğan ’s transition in a manner that preserves the party’s cohesion and the country’s unity. This means honouring Mr. Erdoğan ’s contributions – for example, perhaps commissioning a national project in his name (like a museum or a development fund) that cements his positive legacy – which will please his supporters. Simultaneously, make it clear that Mr. Erdoğan  supports the new leadership fully. If Mr. Erdoğan  can campaign once or twice with his successor, delivering the message “I trust this team with Türkiye’s future,” it will transfer a portion of his personal vote bank to them ². Internally, the party should give Mr. Erdoğan  a respected elder role, but with defined boundaries so as not to overshadow the new leader’s authority. Open communication is key: Mr. Erdoğan  and the core AKP leadership should agree on his post-presidency arrangement well in advance (be it honorary chairman, adviser, or just retired). By removing uncertainty about Mr. Erdoğan ’s intentions, the AKP prevents power struggles and mixed signals to voters. Crucially, avoid any hint that Mr. Erdoğan  seeks to subvert term limits or cling on – that would likely provoke public backlash and international isolation, jeopardising all the gains. Instead, emphasize that Mr. Erdoğan  is choosing the path of statesmanship, abiding by the constitution he himself shaped. This could actually improve AKP’s standing among undecided voters who are ready for change but unsure about the opposition; they might opt for an AKP that demonstrates respect for the rule of law. Guaranteeing Mr. Erdoğan ’s safety and dignity (no witch-hunts, maintaining his presidential pension and honours) will also encourage him to cooperate in this process. In essence, treat Mr. Erdoğan ’s departure not as an end, but as “the opening of a new chapter built on a strong foundation he laid.” That narrative can maintain the emotional bond many voters have with him, while freeing those voters to accept a new AKP era.

In conclusion, Türkiye’s road after Mr. Erdoğan  can be stable and prosperous if navigated with a clear-eyed and proactive strategy. The ruling party holds significant advantages – institutional control, experienced cadres, and a still-considerable support base – but it must not succumb to complacency or authoritarian inertia. The recommendations outlined here urge the AKP to adapt: to fix what’s broken, to preserve what works, and to renew itself where needed. A Türkiye where the economy is recovering, corruption is being addressed, diplomacy is constructive, and leadership change occurs within the constitutional framework will be a Türkiye that remains secure and influential, regardless of who sits in the presidential palace.

For AKP policymakers, the task is to convince the Turkish people that they can have the best of both worlds: stability without stagnation, and change without chaos. That means demonstrating over the next few years that the AKP is not just Mr. Erdoğan ’s party, but Türkiye’s party – capable of self-renewal and committed to every citizen’s well-being. If they succeed, the AKP can extend its governance into the post-Mr. Erdoğan  era with the confidence of public legitimacy. If they fail – by clinging to old ways or personal power – they risk not only their own political future, but also the country’s hard-won gains. The path forward is challenging, but with strategic foresight and genuine reforms, Türkiye after Mr. Erdoğan  can transition into a new phase of stable, inclusive governance. The choices made now will determine whether the Republic enters its second century with continued strength and unity, or with uncertainty and division. The responsibility lies with today’s leaders to ensure it is the former, and the time to act is now.

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