The Future of Pakistan: Navigating Economic, Political, and Security Crossroads

Introduction

Pakistan stands at a precarious crossroads. A convergence of crises-economic turmoil, political instability, and security threats-has raised serious questions about the country’s future trajectory. Once a promising economy and a hopeful democracy, Pakistan is now grappling with stagnant development, a weakening of civilian institutions, and persistent internal conflicts. This report provides a deep policy analysis of Pakistan’s current challenges and possible futures. It examines the historical context and present state of the economic crisis, the decline of democratic governance, developmental stagnation, the legal and political saga surrounding former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and the enduring Baloch insurgency. It then outlines future scenarios for Pakistan and recommends comprehensive policy actions for domestic stakeholders and international partners. The goal is to chart a path toward economic recovery, democratic restoration, conflict resolution, and national reconciliation.

1. Economic Crisis: Roots and Current State

Pakistan’s economy is mired in a severe crisis characterised by ballooning debt, soaring inflation, and critically low foreign exchange reserves. The roots of this turmoil are deep and structural. Decades of poor fiscal management and unproductive economic policies have created persistent imbalances. The government repeatedly ran large budget deficits and borrowed heavily, to the point that interest payments on public debt now consume nearly two-thirds of government revenue ¹. This leaves scant funds for essential services and development. The habit of keeping the currency overvalued to import cheap goods, while accumulating external debt, made Pakistan’s economy noncompetitive and prone to balance-of-payments crises ¹. Periodically, foreign exchange reserves would plunge and force painful devaluations and austerity measures. During the latest episode in 2021-2023, the central bank’s reserves fell to barely two weeks’ import cover, and default on external debt loomed as annual repayment obligations far exceeded reserves ¹. In 2023 the Pakistani rupee lost more than half its value against the dollar and inflation surged to 38%, devastating purchasing power for the average household ¹.

At its core, Pakistan’s economic malaise stems from structural weaknesses and a failure to invest in growth. Population growth has been rapid, outpacing economic expansion and diluting per-capita gains 1. The country’s tax base is exceedingly narrow-tax collection ranks among the worst in the world relative to the economy ¹ -due to endemic tax evasion and exemptions for powerful sectors. Consequently, government revenue cannot support needed spending. Pakistan has repeatedly resorted to external financing and IMF bailouts to avert the crisis, entering nearly two dozen IMF programs over its history. These bailouts provide short-term relief but have not resolved deeper issues ². The result is a cycle of dependency: heavy external debts (public and publicly-guaranteed debt was ~75% of GDP by mid-2024, with 40% owed externally ¹) and debt-servicing costs that crowd out development spending. By 2024, Pakistan faced a “wall” of external debt repayments in the coming years and risked default absent urgent measures ¹. Softening global oil prices and emergency rollovers of loans by China and other creditors provided temporary breathing room ¹, but fundamental vulnerabilities remain.

Several structural deficiencies continue to hobble the economy. The industrial base lacks diversification and competitiveness; exports (dominated by textiles) stagnate while imports (especially energy) strain the trade balance. Chronic energy shortages and an outdated power sector impose frequent blackouts that disrupt industry and discourage investment ². Meanwhile, inflation has remained high, driven by a weak currency, supply chain disruptions, and deficit financing-food and fuel price spikes hit the population hard ². With scant foreign reserves, even minor external shocks (commodity price jumps, global recessions) threaten stability. Unsurprisingly, business confidence is low and both domestic and foreign investors have largely stayed away, deterred by political uncertainty and security concerns ². In sum, Pakistan’s economic crisis is not just a temporary downturn but the cumulative result of long-standing structural problems: an unsustainably small revenue base, high debt and interest burdens, low productivity and exports, energy and infrastructure gaps, and policies that favoured short-term fixes over difficult reforms ².

Moving into 2025, the economy remains in a fragile state. Growth is anaemic, the currency remains under pressure, and inflation-though slightly moderated from 2023 highs-continues in double digits. The government that took power after the 2024 elections faces the daunting task of implementing reforms under an ongoing IMF Extended Fund Facility program while also maintaining social stability amid high unemployment and poverty. Corrective policies (such as subsidy cuts and new taxes) helped avert an immediate default and slightly stabilised the macroeconomic situation ¹, but those measures are politically unpopular and hard to sustain. Pakistan’s people are feeling the pain of rising utility bills, job scarcity, and falling real incomes. Without a significant course correction, the country risks a deeper economic collapse or at best a prolonged period of stagflation. The next sections explore the political and developmental context that intertwines with this economic distress.

2. Political Instability and Democratic Decline

Pakistan’s political institutions are experiencing one of their darkest periods, marked by instability and an erosion of democratic norms. The country has oscillated between fragile civilian rule and outright military regimes throughout its history ⁴. Even in nominally civilian times, the military establishment has remained the ultimate power broker, often manipulating politics from behind the scenes. No elected prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term in Pakistan ⁴, a stark indicator of chronic institutional volatility. In the past few years, this civil-military imbalance has tilted even more sharply in favour of the generals, to the detriment of Pakistan’s democracy.

The current phase of democratic decline accelerated after the contentious ouster of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government in April 2022 via a parliamentary no-confidence vote. Khan accused the military of orchestrating his removal, and subsequent events lent credence to claims of establishment interference ⁴. In the months and years since, Pakistan has witnessed an unprecedented crackdown on dissent. Following mass protests by Khan’s supporters on May 9, 2023 – when some protesters attacked government and army installations – the state unleashed a campaign of repression against Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. Thousands of PTI members, including senior leadership, were arrested; many were held without due process or charged under draconian sedition and anti-terror laws ^{7 13}. In an alarming move, authorities resorted to trying civilians in military courts, resurrecting a practice of parallel justice that bypasses civilian judiciary and harkens back to martial law eras ¹³. Dozens of PTI figures were pressured to publicly renounce the party, effectively coerced into political exile in their own country ¹³. These measures – mass arrests, military trials, enforced disappearances – have drawn condemnation from human rights groups as a brazen assault on civil liberties ¹³.

Media freedom has likewise deteriorated severely. Independent journalism and opposition voices are being muzzled through intimidation and legal harassment. Pakistan dropped to 152nd out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index, reflecting increasing censorship and control by a political-military elite that brooks little dissent ¹³. Journalists face arbitrary arrests, and stringent laws (such as an amended cyber crimes law) have been used to stifle criticism online ¹⁵. Television channels have been pressured to downplay or blackout coverage of opposition figures; for example, some outlets even blurred out Imran Khan’s images under direct orders ²⁴. This shrinking space for free expression has undermined the public’s right to information and removed an important check on power.

The judiciary-another pillar of democracy-has been caught in the crossfire of this political struggle. Historically, Pakistan’s higher judiciary often validated military takeovers or sided with the ruling powers, undermining its independence. Recently, however, there have been signs of judicial push back. In mid-2024, higher courts overturned several lower-court convictions against Imran Khan, providing him legal relief and suggesting a split between some judges and the security establishment ⁷. This has triggered a behind-the-scenes tug of war: the military is widely suspected of pressuring courts and manipulating case assignments to keep Khan locked up, while a segment of the judiciary (including the Supreme Court under a new Chief Justice) has asserted itself by questioning the government’s hard-line tactics ⁷. The result is institutional deadlock-an uneasy standoff between the judiciary and the military-backed executive, contributing to overall political uncertainty ⁷. Instead of being an impartial arbiter, the judiciary has become another arena for Pakistan’s power struggle, which further erodes public trust in democratic institutions.

The cumulative effect of these trends is a democratic backslide into quasi-authoritarian governance. International observers have taken note. Pakistan’s general election in February 2024 was widely viewed as deeply flawed: pre-poll rigging and the exclusion of the largest opposition party (PTI) from a fair contest fatally undermined its credibility ³. On election day, authorities reportedly shutdown internet/cell networks and delayed results, raising suspicions of manipulation ³. Western governments and rights groups have criticised these actions; for instance, the U.K. foreign secretary lamented that legal cases were used to bar certain leaders (a clear reference to Khan) from contesting ³. Yet despite such critiques, Pakistan’s establishment appears intent on maintaining a tight grip on power, even at the cost of global opprobrium and domestic resentment. The dominance of the military in politics and the curtailment of civilian freedoms present a grim picture: a nation of over 240 million people effectively under the sway of an unelected oligarchy of generals and their civilian allies. This political instability and democratic deficit not only betray Pakistan’s constitutional principles but also exacerbate the economic and social problems, as ad-hoc authoritarian fixes cannot substitute for inclusive, accountable governance.

3. Developmental Stagnation

One of the most perplexing aspects of Pakistan’s trajectory is its stagnation in human development despite favourable demographics and strategic importance. In the early decades after independence, Pakistan’s social indicators were on par with or even ahead of many regional peers. Yet today, Pakistan lags behind most of South Asia on key measures of education, health, and infrastructure. This section examines why a country with a large youth population and significant external partnerships (such as foreign aid and alliances) has failed to translate these advantages into broad-based human development.

Pakistan’s gross national income per capita relative to neighbours in the 1970s vs 2023. In the early 1970s Pakistan had the highest per capita income in South Asia, but by 2023 it had fallen to around half that of Bangladesh, India, or Sri Lanka ¹. Pakistan’s economic growth and human development have lagged behind its peers, reflecting decades of under investment and policy missteps.

Pakistan’s human development indicators paint a sobering picture. According to the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), Pakistan ranks near the bottom among medium-development countries, and progress has slowed to a crawl in recent years ²³. Literacy rates (especially for women) remain low; a third of primary-age children are out of school, and those in school often suffer poor learning outcomes. In terms of health, Pakistan has the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in South Asia and faces stubbornly high levels of childhood stunting due to malnutrition ¹. Life expectancy at birth in Pakistan is around 66 years, the lowest among its neighbours (for comparison, Bangladesh and India are in the 70s) ¹. Alarmingly, Pakistan has actually fallen behind countries it once surpassed. In the 1970s, the average Pakistani was richer and lived longer than the average Bangladeshi ¹. Today, Bangladesh – once far poorer – not only has a higher per capita income but also better social metrics like life expectancy and literacy. Similarly, India and Sri Lanka have raced ahead in educating their populations and improving health outcomes, while Pakistan has stagnated or even regressed on some indicators ¹. These statistics underscore a development paradox: Pakistan has a youthful, growing population (~60% under 30) ²² that could be a demographic dividend, yet this potential is unrealised due to insufficient investment in human capital.

Several factors explain Pakistan’s developmental stagnation. Foremost is the low priority given to social spending. Pakistan consistently spends only about 2-3% of GDP on education and similarly low levels on health – percentages far below the levels in other developing countries and inadequate for its needs. Massive expenditures on the military and debt servicing squeeze the budget for schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. As a result, public schools lack basic facilities, and government hospitals are overcrowded and under-resourced. Another factor is weak governance and endemic corruption, which have led to the failure of many development initiatives. Large infrastructure projects often suffer delays and cost overruns, and funds intended for public services can be lost to mismanagement. For example, the power sector’s chronic woes (circular debt, distribution losses) mean frequent electricity outages across the country, crippling industries and inconveniencing households ². Similarly, access to clean drinking water and sanitation remains poor for a large segment of the population, contributing to health problems.

Pakistan’s youth bulge, while often cited as an opportunity, poses a serious challenge under current conditions. Each year, millions of young Pakistanis enter the labor force, but job creation has not kept up. With an economy struggling to grow, many youth face underemployment or unemployment, fuelling frustration. Education quality is uneven, leaving graduates ill-prepared for skilled jobs. If not addressed, this demographic pressure could turn into a “ticking time bomb” of social unrest. As it stands, Pakistan ranks very low (162 out of 180 countries) on the Global Youth Development Index ²¹, reflecting young people’s poor outcomes in education, employment, and civic participation. The frustration of educated but jobless youth has already been seen in protest movements and could intensify if their aspirations remain unfulfilled.

It is perplexing that Pakistan’s geostrategic significance has not translated into development gains for its people. The country has received tens of billions in foreign aid over decades (whether from Western allies during the Cold War and post-9/11, or from China more recently under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). Yet these inflows haven’t appreciably raised living standards at the grassroots. One reason is that aid was often security-oriented or poorly governed; funds propped up the state but didn’t trickle down effectively. Additionally, political instability and conflict (from internal insurgencies to wars with neighbouring India) have repeatedly diverted attention and resources away from development. For example, regions like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan that were battlegrounds against insurgents saw schools destroyed and health services disrupted for years. Nationally, the constant churn of governments and policies impeded continuity in development planning.

Pakistan’s developmental stagnation is a result of policy neglect and misplaced priorities. The country has failed to invest in its greatest resource – its people. Insufficient spending on education and health, coupled with rapid population growth, has produced a large, youthful population lacking the skills and opportunities to drive growth. Infrastructure bottlenecks (energy, transport, water) further constrain productivity and quality of life. The outcome is that Pakistan significantly trails its peers in South Asia on most human development metrics ¹, a trend that will be hard to reverse without drastic changes. The next sections turn to the political realm and security challenges, which both influence and are influenced by this socio-economic under performance.

4. Imran Khan’s Legal Troubles and Political Prospects

Former Prime Minister Imran Khan is at the centre of Pakistan’s current political storm. Once propelled to power in 2018 amid great public enthusiasm, Khan now finds himself behind bars, ensnared in a multitude of legal cases. His fate has major implications for Pakistan’s stability: Khan remains arguably Pakistan’s most popular politician despite his ouster ¹², and how the state handles his detention and potential return to politics could shape the country’s political future.

Legal charges and imprisonment: Since being removed from office, Imran Khan has faced an onslaught of court cases, ranging from corruption and bribery to sedition and terrorism. The charges seem to multiply by the month. In August 2023, Khan was arrested and later convicted in the Toshakhana graft case (involving misdeclaration of official gifts), receiving a three-year prison sentence that disqualified him from politics for five years ²⁰. Although that conviction was eventually overturned on appeal, Khan was immediately re-arrested on other charges, ensuring he remained in custody ⁷. Over time, the case list against him has grown to include: embezzlement and corruption (such as the Al-Qadir Trust land case), “terrorism” and incitement (for allegedly orchestrating protests that turned violent, especially the May 9, 2023 incidents), treason/espionage (related to a leaked diplomatic cable he cited to claim a foreign conspiracy), and even personal charges like illicit marriage (a bizarre case concerning the timing of his marriage). In January 2025, a special anti-graft court held a trial inside Rawalpindi Jail and handed Khan a 14-year prison term in a corruption case involving allegations that he and his wife received land as a bribe during his premiership ⁸. Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi, was also convicted in that case (7-year term), highlighting how the net has widened around his inner circle ⁸. Khan and his lawyers dismiss all these prosecutions as politically motivated and orchestrated by the military establishment to sideline him ⁸. Indeed, the timing and manner of many cases raise due process concerns: trials held in haste (even in absentia or in prison), shifting judges, and a presumption of guilt that suggests the outcome is pre-decided.

Despite the legal barrage, Imran Khan’s popularity endures. Even from a jail cell, he commands a loyal following. Prior to the 2024 elections, PTI-backed independent candidates (since the party itself was practically banned) still managed to win the largest number of seats in the National Assembly ⁷, indicating that a significant portion of the electorate remains pro-Khan. Polls through 2023 consistently showed Khan as the country’s most favoured political leader, far ahead of rivals from the traditional parties. His anti-establishment narrative-portraying himself as a crusader against corruption and a victim of elite conspiracy-resonates deeply with many Pakistanis disillusioned by decades of misrule. Khan’s continued appeal has made him a potent symbol: to his supporters, he represents hope for genuine change; to the establishment, he represents a dangerous challenge to the status quo. This dynamic creates a dilemma for the authorities: keeping him locked up risks turning him into a martyr and further delegitimizing the government, but releasing him could rejuvenate mass opposition.

How long can the government keep him detained? Realistically, the current strategy of incessant legal cases has limits. Thus far, it has succeeded in physically removing Khan from the scene and dampening street protests-the PTI has been largely demobilised through fear and repression ⁷. But this strategy is unlikely to be sustainable indefinitely. For one, Pakistan’s judiciary, as noted, has started asserting some independence. By mid-2024, higher courts had voided at least one of Khan’s convictions and granted him bail in others ⁷. The Supreme Court has signalled discomfort with blatantly flimsy cases, even if it hasn’t outright confronted the military. It is plausible that judicial relief will eventually force Khan’s release if the evidence against him remains weak or concocted. Additionally, as time passes, the government’s justification for detaining a former Prime Minister on sweeping charges without securing definitive convictions grows thin in the eyes of the public and international community. The longer Khan is held in what many observers see as “arbitrary detention”, the more pressure builds-from human rights organisations (Amnesty International has called for his immediate release as a political prisoner) ¹⁴ and from foreign lawmakers who have started to question Pakistan’s democratic credentials ⁷.

It is also a question of political calculus. The current military-backed government may prefer to keep Khan behind bars through the next election cycle to avoid the risk of him mobilising voters. Yet, if his absence renders the election illegitimate in the eyes of many (as happened in 2024), Pakistan could face prolonged instability and international isolation. There are rumours of behind-the-scenes negotiations: for example, reports in early 2025 suggested nascent talks between Khan’s camp and the government to cool tensions, but a harsh new sentence (like the 14-year term in January 2025) can derail any compromise ⁸. Realistically, the state can delay Khan’s return to freedom via continual charges, but it cannot erase his popular support. As one analyst quipped, “You can jail the leader, but you can’t jail the ideas he has inspired.” Thus, unless Khan’s health or resolve break (he is in his 70s but still relatively fit), keeping him detained indefinitely would be highly perilous and likely untenable. The more pragmatic elements in the establishment might seek an exit strategy where Khan is released under certain conditions (perhaps barred from immediate office but free to live in exile or participate politically in a limited way).

Scenarios if he is released: Khan’s release, whenever it occurs, will be a pivotal moment. One scenario is a triumphant return: Khan could galvanise massive crowds, reassert himself as the opposition’s figurehead, and possibly drive Pakistan into a new phase of agitation demanding early elections or systemic change. His freedom could reunite splintered PTI factions and reignite street politics, putting pressure on the government and military. Such a scenario might resemble 2007, when another popular ex-PM (Nawaz Sharif) returned from exile to rapturous support, hastening the end of General Musharraf’s rule. However, there are also moderated scenarios. If Khan is released as part of a deal or understanding, he might agree (even if reluctantly) to tone down confrontations in exchange for the charges being dropped. For instance, he could be freed on bail but legally barred from office until certain cases conclude, effectively keeping him out of power but not in prison. In this case, he might play the role of a vocal opposition leader but within certain “red lines” that the establishment would enforce. Another possibility is exile – though Khan has so far rejected leaving Pakistan, the authorities might try to revive the old playbook (used with Nawaz Sharif in 2000) of releasing him conditional on him going abroad for an extended period. Exile would remove him from the immediate political arena, but in today’s connected age, he could still influence politics from abroad (through video addresses to supporters, etc.).

In any event, Khan’s personal future is entwined with Pakistan’s broader political future. If handled poorly (e.g. if harm comes to him in custody or if he is barred in a blatantly unjust way), Pakistan could see intensified unrest and a collapse of whatever legitimacy the current rulers claim. If handled deftly, his reintegration could be part of a broader national reconciliation that eases tensions. The next section examines one of Pakistan’s longest-running internal conflicts – the Baloch insurgency – before we turn to overall future scenarios and policy recommendations that tie all these threads together.

5. The Baloch Liberation Movement

Pakistan’s stability is not only threatened by economic and political crises, but also by persistent internal conflicts. Foremost among these is the Baloch insurgency in the southwestern province of Balochistan. Often termed the “forgotten war,” the Baloch liberation movement has simmered (and periodically flared) since Pakistan’s very birth. This section provides a historical overview of the conflict, assesses its current momentum, and examines why it remains a stubborn thorn in Pakistan’s side.

Historical overview: Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but least populated province, has seen multiple armed uprisings by ethnic Baloch nationalists. The Baloch are an ethnolinguistic group with a distinct identity, and many have long resented what they view as exploitation and marginalisation by the Punjabi-dominated central state ¹⁰. The first armed revolt erupted in 1948, only a year after independence, when a Baloch chief refused to accede his region (Kalat) to Pakistan. Since then, historians count five phases of insurgency: in the 1950s, late 1960s, a major insurgency in 1973-77, and the current phase which began in the early 2000s ^{18 19}. Each time, the trigger has been a mix of political grievances and heavy-handed state response. The 1970s insurgency, for example, was sparked by the federal government’s dismissal of a democratically elected Balochistan government and was met with a brutal military campaign, leaving thousands dead. After a lull in the 1980s-90s, the current insurgency reignited in 2004 during General Musharraf’s rule, particularly after the 2006 killing of revered Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti by the Pakistan Army ¹⁰. Since 2004, various Baloch militant groups have waged a low-intensity but relentless guerrilla war against the state.

The drivers of conflict have remained consistent: Baloch nationalists demand greater autonomy or outright independence, an end to the exploitation of Balochistan’s rich natural resources by outsiders, and justice for human rights abuses. Balochistan is resource-rich (natural gas, coal, minerals) yet its people are among the poorest in Pakistan – around 70% of Balochistan’s population lives in multidimensional poverty ¹⁰. Baloch insurgents argue that profits from local resources (like the large Sui gas field) are siphoned off to enrich other provinces while Baloch locals get little benefit. Culturally and politically, they also resent the heavy presence of the Pakistani military in their region and the lack of control over their own affairs. Over decades, these grievances have only deepened as disappearances of Baloch activists (allegedly by security forces) and harsh crackdowns fuelled a cycle of anger and revenge.

Current momentum: In recent years, the Baloch insurgency, though under reported, has seen an uptick in bold attacks, indicating it remains very much alive. A series of deadly coordinated assaults in August 2024 demonstrated the militants’ reach. Over two nights, Baloch insurgents (claiming to be from the Baloch Liberation Army, BLA) launched at least six attacks across the province, including the brazen targeted killing of non-Baloch labourers-pulling ethnic Punjabi passengers off buses and executing them-and ambushes on military convoys ⁹. At least 74 people were killed in those attacks, marking a significant escalation even by Balochistan’s standards ⁹. The militants timed the operation to the anniversary of Akbar Bugti’s death, underlining its symbolic intent ¹⁰. Pakistani officials had claimed the insurgency was dying down, but the scale and coordination of these attacks suggested otherwise ¹⁰. Indeed, far from a spent force, the insurgents appear to have grown more sophisticated.

In early 2025, another unprecedented incident underscored the insurgents’ audacity: the hijacking of a passenger train. Militants from a BLA faction derailed and seized a train (the Jaffar Express) in the rugged Bolan area, taking hundreds of passengers hostage (mostly off-duty security personnel) for nearly two days ¹¹. This operation, which ended with a commando rescue and dozens dead, showed that some Baloch groups can mount large-scale, complex attacks beyond hit-and-run tactics. The insurgents have also carried out high-profile suicide bombings – including using women bombers from the BLA’s Majeed Brigade – targeting Chinese nationals and projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ¹¹. For example, they claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at Karachi University’s Confucius Institute in 2022 that killed Chinese teachers. Their message is clear: they oppose CPEC projects (like the strategic Gwadar port and mining ventures) which they consider another form of exploitation of their land ¹⁰. The evolution of tactics (suicide attacks, temporary seizures of territory, coordinated strikes) and the formation of umbrella alliances like the Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS), which unites several militant outfits, have enhanced the insurgency’s resilience ¹¹.

Pakistan’s military has periodically responded with large clearing operations, and officials often claim to have killed or arrested key militant leaders. But such heavy-handed responses have not extinguished the rebellion-in some cases, they exacerbate it. In 2024, the government once again announced a new counter-insurgency operation to “clean up” Balochistan ¹⁰. Yet analysts warn that relying on brute force while ignoring political root causes is a mistake. Decades of repression without reconciliation have led to a situation where new generations of Baloch fighters keep picking up arms. The insurgency also has a cross-border dimension: militants reportedly find sanctuaries in the border regions of Afghanistan and Iran where Baloch populations live, complicating Pakistan’s efforts. Regionally, Pakistani officials accuse India of covertly supporting Baloch rebels as a way to destabilize Pakistan (India denies this). These international angles mean the conflict also affects Pakistan’s foreign relations.

Persistent internal threat: The Baloch insurgency might not threaten to overthrow the state, but it is a chronic security drain and a source of instability. It ties down a large number of troops and paramilitary forces in a vast province, costs lives each year, and deters investment (few investors are comfortable investing in a region where pipelines get blown up and engineers are kidnapped). Major projects like the Gwadar Port and Reko Diq mining venture face constant security risks ¹⁰. Additionally, the conflict fuels human rights issues – Baloch activists and even non-combatant civilians have allegedly been subject to enforced disappearances (the “missing persons” crisis), extrajudicial killings (a grim “kill and dump” policy, as human rights groups call it), and collective punishments that breed long-term resentment ⁹. The conflict also undermines national cohesion; Balochistan’s sense of alienation from the federation grows every time a young Baloch sees the army as an occupying force rather than a national institution.

The Baloch liberation movement remains a smouldering insurgency that Pakistan has not been able to resolve. Historically rooted grievances about autonomy and resources continue to drive militancy. The state’s reliance on force, without meaningful political dialogue, has failed to end the conflict – as evidenced by major attacks in 2024-2025 showing the insurgents’ enduring capability ^{10 11}. The Balochistan crisis is a reminder that Pakistan’s internal unity is far from settled, and it exemplifies how denying legitimate political rights can fuel endless cycles of violence. Any vision for Pakistan’s future stability must grapple with Balochistan’s demands for dignity, development, and a greater say in its own affairs.

6. Future Scenarios for Pakistan

Looking ahead, Pakistan’s trajectory could follow divergent paths depending on how leadership, policy choices, and unforeseen events play out. In this section, we sketch several plausible future scenarios – from tenuous stability to severe turmoil – by considering how political leadership transitions, economic management, and insurgent dynamics might unfold. These scenarios are not predictions so much as explorations of risks and opportunities that lie before Pakistan.

Scenario A: Fragile Authoritarian Stability – In this scenario, the status quo more or less continues over the next few years. The military establishment, possibly through a pliant civilian government, maintains a tight grip on power. Democratic norms remain suppressed: elections are tightly managed (as in 2024) to exclude disruptive challengers like Imran Khan, and any dissent is quickly quashed. With the opposition fractured and the media still under heavy censorship, the regime enjoys a semblance of control. This might bring short-term stability of a negative sort – protests die down due to fear, and the government can claim to focus on governance without political “distractions.” On the economic front, this leadership would continue to seek IMF support and bailouts from allies (China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) to avert collapse. Some tough economic reforms might be partially implemented, but without broad buy-in or legitimacy they would stop short of anything that threatens elite interests (for instance, no serious moves to tax the powerful or curb military businesses). The economy might limp along with low growth, high inflation and unemployment remaining a problem, but outright default is narrowly avoided through external aid. Social discontent simmers but does not boil over, as people are exhausted or intimidated. Security-wise, the state would double down on force to handle insurgencies: more military operations in Balochistan, harsher tactics against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the northwest. This might contain violence in the short term, but at the cost of continued human rights issues. Essentially, Pakistan under this scenario resembles a soft authoritarian state – not formally a dictatorship, but with democratic facades barely hiding the military’s iron grip. The risk here is that such stability is brittle. A severe economic shock (like a global recession or sanctions), or a major crisis (e.g. a high-casualty terrorist attack or a natural disaster) could upset the balance. Moreover, without legitimate governance, public anger could explode unexpectedly. But absent those triggers, Pakistan muddles through in a stagnant equilibrium: not collapsing, but not fulfilling its potential either, and remaining isolated on the world stage as a quasi-pariah for its anti-democratic practices ¹⁷.

Scenario B: Democratic Renewal and Reform – This more optimistic scenario envisions Pakistan stepping back from the precipice by undertaking significant political and economic reforms. It could be precipitated by a change in leadership attitude within the establishment or external pressure. For instance, the military could conclude that the current approach is untenable (perhaps due to international isolation or fear of internal backlash) and permit a genuine political opening. In this scenario, credible elections are eventually held – perhaps in response to domestic protests or diplomatic nudges – allowing previously repressed voices (including Imran Khan’s party or its successors) to compete freely. A new government with a fresh public mandate comes to power, which could even be a broad coalition of major parties agreeing on minimal rules of the game. This civilian government, enjoying greater legitimacy, initiates an era of national reconciliation – releasing political prisoners, repealing draconian laws, restoring media freedoms, and engaging in dialogue with opposition and civil society. The military, under internal or external pressure, agrees to step back at least somewhat, perhaps under guarantees that its core interests (like control over security policy or certain economic perks) will be respected in the short term. With a more pluralistic and calmer political atmosphere, the government can tackle economic reforms with public support. It implements structural changes (tax reforms, energy sector overhaul, spending on human development) that, while painful, are cushioned by transparency and social safety nets. International financial institutions and allies respond positively to a democratic Pakistan: investment and aid flow in, seeing the country as more stable and creditworthy. Over a few years, Pakistan’s economy gradually recovers – not a miracle, but avoiding disaster and showing modest growth. Importantly, this scenario would involve outreach to disaffected regions: a serious political negotiation with Baloch leaders might be launched, perhaps offering greater provincial autonomy or economic packages to Balochistan, helping to wind down the insurgency. Similarly, re-integrating the mainstream political opposition (like PTI) into parliament rather than on the streets would channel conflicts into institutions. The challenge in this scenario is its boldness – it requires Pakistan’s powerful institutions to accept short-term uncertainty for longer-term stability. History shows the military has been reluctant to cede power, and politicians have often been bitterly zero-sum. However, a broad realisation could emerge that without a reset, the country’s survival is at risk. If that happens, Pakistan could move towards a more inclusive political order that leverages its young population for progress, much as other developing democracies have managed after bouts of authoritarianism.

Scenario C: Economic Collapse and Social Upheaval – In a worst-case scenario, Pakistan’s crises could feed into each other, spiralling into a collapse of state authority. Economically, if the government fails to meet IMF conditions or alienates key lenders, a default could occur. The Pakistani rupee might free-fall further, and hyperinflation could take hold, wiping out savings and salaries. In such a situation, the poor masses would be hardest hit – imagine inflation north of 50%, hour-long queues for basic goods, and fuel shortages paralysing transport. Public anger, already high, could boil over into riots and looting. Political instability would be amplified: the legitimacy of the ruling setup (already questioned) would evaporate entirely as even the middle classes turn against it. Massive street protests could erupt spontaneously, potentially making the 2023 pro-Imran demonstrations look small. If the army responds with force, it could lead to clashes or even mutiny within lower ranks (drawn from the same populace suffering the crisis). Alternatively, the military might decide to directly take over in a coup “to save the nation” if civilian governance breaks down completely. But unlike past coups, this one would inherit a nearly bankrupt state – a poisoned chalice. Under these extreme stresses, Pakistan’s cohesion could be tested. Separatist sentiments might grow not just in Balochistan but elsewhere; for instance, in Pashtun areas disillusionment with the centre could increase. A bankrupt state would also struggle to pay soldiers and police, weakening security operations. This could embolden militant groups – the TTP could seize territory again in tribal districts, or sectarian militants could unleash violence. Internationally, a nuclear-armed nation in chaos would set off alarm bells; one could imagine emergency interventions of some kind (e.g. coordinated financial rescue packages tied to conditions, or, in a nightmare scenario, concerns about nuclear security prompting international emergency measures). While Pakistan has proved resilient in past crises, this scenario cannot be entirely ruled out if multiple things go wrong at once. 2024 was already one of the most violent years in over a decade in Pakistan due to the mix of political and militant turmoil ¹⁷. An escalated meltdown could make governance almost impossible. The saving grace might be that all stakeholders realise how disastrous this would be and thus pull back from the brink before it’s too late.

Scenario D: Continued Militant Conflict amid Status Quo – A fourth scenario can be considered which is a bit of a mix: the government/establishment remains largely as in Scenario A (authoritarian leaning), and while it avoids economic collapse, it also fails to solve security threats. Pakistan could then face a future much like the 2010s but worse – with the military fighting on multiple internal fronts. If political exclusion of groups like PTI continues, some factions of society might radicalise beyond the political process. The worst-case here would be if disillusioned segments of educated youth, having lost faith in peaceful change, drift towards extremist ideologies or armed struggle, boosting the ranks of groups like the TTP or even new urban extremist cells. The Baloch insurgency, if not addressed politically, could escalate in response to harsher crackdowns. The year 2025 might see even more daring Baloch attacks (as the train hijacking suggests) ¹¹, prompting the army to commit more troops to Balochistan. Meanwhile, the Taliban victory next door in Afghanistan has already emboldened the Pakistani Taliban; in this scenario, they continue to wreak havoc with bombings and ambushes, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Pakistan could thus be looking at a future where the state is stuck in a constant counter-insurgency mode internally. This would be a drain on finances, and it would deter foreign investment even if macroeconomic measures improve somewhat. Under such pressure, the military’s influence would further entrench (justifying its role as savior), thus perpetuating the cycle of weak civilian governance. Essentially, Pakistan would survive but in a state of perpetual low-level conflict and emergency, with development and democracy on the back burner indefinitely. This scenario is a distinct possibility if neither genuine reform (Scenario B) nor total breakdown (Scenario C) occurs – it is a grim “middle path” of a security state managing unrest rather than resolving root problems.

Of course, reality might combine elements of these scenarios. Pakistan’s future will not be linear; there may be moments of progress and moments of regression. Leadership transitions will matter – a change in Army leadership or the outcome of a power struggle within the elite could open or close windows for reform. Economic management will be critical – prudent policies could stave off disaster, whereas continued populist or kleptocracy choices will worsen the outlook. Lastly, insurgent dynamics (whether the state makes peace with disaffected groups or faces new waves of militancy) will significantly influence which path Pakistan follows. In the final section below, this report offers policy proposals aimed at steering Pakistan toward a more stable and prosperous trajectory, mitigating the risks highlighted in these scenarios.

7. Policy Proposals

Addressing Pakistan’s multifaceted crises requires bold and coordinated actions on several fronts. This section presents comprehensive and actionable recommendations in four key areas: economic recovery, democratic restoration, conflict resolution in Balochistan, and national reconciliation. These proposals are directed primarily at Pakistani policymakers and stakeholders, but they also highlight where international support can play a role. The underlying principle is that Pakistan’s challenges are interlinked – economic revival is tied to political stability, which in turn depends on inclusive governance and peace within its borders ². Reforms must therefore proceed in parallel across these domains to break the vicious cycle and set Pakistan on a virtuous path.

7.1 Economic Recovery and Reform

• Fiscal Reforms – Broaden the Tax Base: Pakistan must radically improve tax collection to escape its debt trap. Remaining among the world’s worst performers in tax-to-GDP ratio is untenable ¹. The government should expand the tax net to include under-taxed sectors (agriculture, real estate, retail) and crack down on evasion by elites. This could involve digitising tax administration and ending arbitrary tax amnesties. A realistic goal is to raise revenues by an additional 1% of GDP each year for the next five years ¹. Doing so would create fiscal space to reduce deficits and fund public services. International partners can assist by providing technical support for tax reform and transparency measures (for instance, helping track undeclared offshore assets of Pakistani elites). Without a broader tax base, Pakistan will remain aid-dependent and unable to invest in its future.
  
• Right-Size Expenditures – Cut Waste, Boost Social Spending: While raising revenue, Pakistan must also spend more wisely. This means cutting wasteful or non-productive expenditures and reallocating funds to development. Defence spending, while sensitive, should be scrutinised for efficiencies given it consumes a large share of the budget. Subsidies that mostly benefit the well-off (e.g. untargeted energy subsidies) should be replaced with targeted support for the poor. Critically, the government should increase spending on health, education, and social protection by at least a few percent of GDP over the medium term ¹. Investing in human capital will not only improve lives but also support long-term growth by creating a more skilled workforce. Such spending boosts should be done in a fiscally responsible way – financed by the new tax revenue and savings from lower debt interest (as debt is brought under control)¹. Pakistan’s development gaps (schools, clinics, clean water) are too large to ignore; allocating, for example, half of incremental revenues to social and infrastructure development would strike a balance between reform and welfare ¹.
  
• Energy and Infrastructure Reforms: Reliable power, transport, and water infrastructure are the backbone of any economy. Pakistan must tackle the chronic dysfunction in its power sector. This includes reducing circular debt (over 4% of GDP in unpaid power bills ¹) by adjusting tariffs to realistic levels, improving bill collection, and investing in upgrading transmission lines to reduce losses ¹. Renewable energy projects should be fast-tracked to decrease reliance on expensive imported fuel. The government should also complete key infrastructure projects (e.g. dams, highways, rail modernisation) that can create jobs in the short term and remove growth bottlenecks long term. Here, international concessional financing can help: lenders like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are more likely to fund infrastructure if governance improves. Every dollar invested in infrastructure or climate resilience (flood defences, irrigation systems) pays dividends by boosting productivity and preventing disaster costs ¹. Ensuring transparency and involving reputable firms in project execution will improve outcomes and donor confidence ¹.
  
• Structural Reforms and Private Sector Revival: Pakistan’s economy needs a structural overhaul to unleash private sector growth. Key reforms should include: privatising or overhauling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that bleed public funds ¹ (Pakistan International Airlines and energy distribution companies, for example, either need strategic partnerships or management reforms to stop losses). Streamlining business regulations and improving the ease of doing business is essential – one-stop investment facilitation, simpler licensing, and strengthening contract enforcement would encourage entrepreneurs. The country should capitalise on its youthful workforce by promoting sectors where it has comparative advantage: IT services, textiles/apparel (moving up the value chain), agri-business, etc. To do this, Pakistan can establish special economic zones with tax breaks and reliable infrastructure to attract both local and foreign investors. Another critical area is population management: expanding access to family planning could slow population growth, easing pressure on jobs and social services ¹. This requires investing in reproductive health programs and education, especially targeting girls and women, which would over time support a more sustainable development path ¹.
  
• Debt Restructuring and International Support: Given Pakistan’s heavy external debt repayments in coming years, the government should proactively seek to restructure debt with minimal market disruption. Engaging in negotiations with key creditors (China, Paris Club members, multilateral) to extend maturities or adjust rates could prevent future default scares. Coordination among creditors is crucial; Pakistan should improve transparency of its debt data to build trust ¹. The IMF’s ongoing program can be used as a framework, but Pakistan might need additional concessional financing beyond the IMF to truly stabilise ¹. For instance, a consortium of donors could provide a support package earmarked for development projects (not just budget support) – effectively a mini-Marshall Plan for Pakistan’s economy, contingent on reform progress. Friendly nations in the Middle East and China have rolled over loans; they could be convinced to swap debt for investments in Pakistan (for example, forgiving some debt in exchange for stakes in infrastructure projects that will help Pakistan grow). Such creative approaches would require diplomatic finesse but could substantially lighten the debt burden ¹. The end goal is to bring Pakistan’s debt metrics into a sustainable range (debt well below 60% of GDP, interest below say 25% of revenues ¹) so that the economy isn’t perpetually on the verge of crisis.
  

7.2 Democratic Restoration and Institutional Reform

• Free and Fair Elections: The cornerstone of democratic restoration is ensuring genuinely free and fair elections in which all major political forces can participate. The government and Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) must commit to levelling the playing field. This involves ending the practice of using court cases or election rules to arbitrarily disqualify popular leaders – recent examples being the removal of Imran Khan and the barring of PTI’s name from ballots ³. All politically motivated charges against opposition figures should be reviewed and, where appropriate, dropped to allow them to contest. Pakistan should invite reputable international observers (from the EU, Commonwealth, etc.) to monitor the next elections to build credibility. Reforms to strengthen the ECP’s independence are also needed: for instance, a neutral multi-party committee could oversee high-level appointments to the ECP to avoid bias ³. If a truly inclusive election is held and the results respected, it would go a long way in restoring public faith in democracy and reducing street confrontations.
  
• Rebalance Civil-Military Relations: Pakistan’s democracy cannot thrive until the military’s role in politics is reduced to constitutional bounds. While this is a delicate, long-term endeavour, steps can be taken immediately. A starting point is institutionalising civilian oversight of the military and intelligence agencies. Parliamentary committees on defence and national security should be empowered to review defence budgets and question military policy (anathema in the past, but routine in democracies). The new government could enact a charter or pact (building on the Charter of Democracy signed by major parties in 2006) where all parties agree not to solicit military intervention against one another. The military, for its part, should reaffirm in public its commitment to remain apolitical – and crucially, follow through in practice by avoiding any meddling in media or elections. To encourage this shift, judicial and legislative measures may be needed: for instance, strengthening contempt laws or penalties against those who subvert civilian processes (even if they are generals). International partners like the U.S. and UK can reinforce this by conditioning some military aid or cooperation on non-interference in politics ³. The ultimate goal is to slowly transform the civil-military equation from one of dominance to one of balance, akin to how Turkey curtailed its army’s political role in the past (a potential learning example ¹⁶). This will likely require confidence-building: assuring the military that its legitimate interests (national security, adequate defence budget) will be respected by civilians, so that it feels less “need” to interfere.
  
• Strengthen the Judiciary and Rule of Law: An independent judiciary is vital for democracy and for investor confidence. Reforms should aim to insulate judges from political pressure and improve the efficiency of courts. The Supreme Court and High Courts must regain public trust by demonstrating impartiality – for example, by promptly adjudicating politically sensitive cases on merit rather than delaying or showing bias. The new government can repeal or amend recent laws that curtailed judicial powers (such as controversial legislation that sought to limit the Chief Justice’s suo motu authority in 2023). Additionally, a reform of the judicial appointment process, perhaps introducing a more transparent nomination commission, could help ensure judges are chosen for competence and integrity, not loyalty. The huge backlog of cases also needs addressing: setting up additional courts or fast-track procedures for minor offenses would help ordinary citizens see justice in their lifetimes, bolstering faith in the system. For rule of law to prevail, the practice of military courts for civilians should be immediately stopped and outlawed via legislation if possible – civilians must only be tried in civilian courts with due process ¹³. Pakistan should also make enforced disappearances a criminal offense and empower judicial inquiries into any alleged abductions by security agencies. These steps would signal a clear break from authoritarian practices and a return to constitutionalism.
  
• Restore Media Freedom: The media is democracy’s watchdog. To restore its freedom, the authorities should lift all informal “press advisories” and directives that censor coverage. Licenses of TV channels that were unfairly cancelled should be reviewed (for example, if channels were taken off-air for airing opposition rallies, they should be allowed to resume normal reporting). Repressive laws like the amended Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016, which was used to charge journalists and social media users for criticism ¹⁵, should be rolled back or revised in consultation with journalist bodies to prevent misuse. Furthermore, the government should investigate and hold accountable those behind attacks on journalists. In 2024, Pakistan saw record attacks on journalists, reflecting a dangerous climate ¹⁴. By prosecuting perpetrators of violence against media personnel (no matter their affiliation), the state can set a new tone that press intimidation will not be tolerated. Support for independent public broadcasters and community radio could also ensure diverse voices are heard beyond the main private channels. Over time, a free media will help counter misinformation and allow healthy debate on policies – something Pakistan desperately needs as it navigates tough reforms.
  
• Empower Civil Society and Protect Rights: Alongside formal institutions, Pakistan’s vibrant civil society – lawyers, activists, NGOs – needs space to operate. The government should end the harassment of human rights organisations and activists who speak on issues like missing persons, women’s rights, or minority rights. Any restrictions on NGO activities (like onerous registration rules or foreign funding curbs introduced in recent years) should be eased, so long as groups are transparent. Encouraging civic engagement can actually help defuse extremism by giving people peaceful outlets to express discontent. The state should also signal a break from past abuses by actively addressing human rights concerns. This could include releasing political prisoners detained without charge, compensating families of those unlawfully killed (for instance, offering restitution and public acknowledgement for victims of extrajudicial killings in counter-terror operations), and inviting the UN Special Rapporteur to visit and assess the human rights situation openly. Such measures would start to rebuild Pakistan’s image and heal society’s wounds, creating a more conducive environment for democracy to flourish.
  
  

7.3 Conflict Resolution in Balochistan

• Political Dialogue and Autonomy: The insurgency in Balochistan ultimately requires a political solution, not just a military one ¹⁰. The government should immediately offer to hold unconditional talks with Baloch nationalist leaders – both parliamentary moderates and, through intermediaries, even exiled militant leaders. A credible peace dialogue could be facilitated by neutral actors (for instance, tribal elders or respected figures from other provinces) and possibly observed by international guarantors (perhaps the UN or friendly countries) to build trust. The core of a political settlement would likely involve greater autonomy for Balochistan: fully implementing Pakistan’s 18th Constitutional Amendment (which devolved powers to provinces) in letter and spirit, and even considering additional guarantees. One idea is a new “Balochistan Accord” that assures the province a larger share of its resource revenues (e.g. Balochistan might retain a majority of profits from local gas and mineral extraction, compared to current arrangements) and more say in local development decisions. The federal government should also consider transferring certain subjects like mineral licensing and local security to provincial authority under oversight, to give Baloch citizens a sense of ownership. Learning from successful autonomy deals elsewhere (like the Mindanao peace agreement in the Philippines or Aceh in Indonesia) could be useful in crafting terms that preserve sovereignty while satisfying ethnic aspirations.
  
• End Human Rights Abuses & Foster Reconciliation: To signal a genuine shift, Pakistan’s security forces must end practices that have fuelled Baloch grievances, especially enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. The government should set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Balochistan, which would investigate past abuses by all sides. This commission could include Baloch activists, retired judges, and army representatives, and be empowered to recommend measures like release of detainees, return of missing persons (or at least information on their fates), and prosecution of individuals involved in egregious violations. Offering an amnesty or rehabilitation program to rank-and-file Baloch fighters who lay down arms could encourage insurgents to come in from the cold. Such programs have seen some success in other insurgencies, but they require providing alternate livelihoods, so parallel economic opportunities must be readied (e.g. allocating government jobs, vocational training, or land for farming to former fighters who disarm). The security presence in Balochistan should be reviewed: a gradual withdrawal of the army from civilian areas, and its replacement by local police and levies (with Baloch representation), would reduce the martial law atmosphere. Over time, confidence-building steps like allowing greater freedom of expression (letting Baloch nationalist political parties and student groups operate freely) will show that dissent will be handled politically rather than militarily. Analysts have warned that without such changes, a heavy-handed approach will perpetuate the crisis ¹⁰ – the state must show it has learned the lessons of past mistakes.
  
• Economic Development for Balochistan: Development is a key part of addressing Balochistan’s sense of deprivation. The government should launch a special development package for Balochistan focused on healthcare, education, and infrastructure in remote districts. This could include building hospitals, vocational institutes, roads connecting villages to markets, and ensuring clean water supply – basic services that many Baloch citizens lack. Crucially, locals must be involved in these projects (for example, hiring local labor and consulting local communities on their needs) to ensure they feel the benefits. Projects under CPEC and other investments in Balochistan (like the Reko Diq copper/gold mine) should guarantee a quota of jobs for local people and a share of royalties to the provincial budget. If people see that major projects will improve their own lives – through employment, royalties funding local schools, etc. – they will be less inclined to support attacks on them. Another idea is to establish a Balochistan Development Fund with contributions from the federal government and foreign partners, which could be overseen by a board including Baloch civil society, to transparently invest in social programs. International donors (for instance, the Gulf states or Western countries) might contribute if they see it as part of peace-building. Alongside big projects, attention must be given to integrating Baloch youth: expanding scholarships for Baloch students to attend universities (inside Pakistan or abroad) and join civil services can help bridge the representation gap. In short, “guns and butter” must go hand in hand: reduce the guns, increase the butter (development), and the appeal of insurgency will diminish.
  
• Regional Diplomacy: Given the cross-border nature of the Baloch issue, Pakistan should engage diplomatically with neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan to ensure they cooperate in resolving the insurgency. Iran also faces a Baloch insurgency in its Sistan-Baluchestan province; both countries would benefit from sharing intelligence and denying militants sanctuary across the border. A joint Pakistan-Iran development initiative for the Baloch regions (one that perhaps also involves cross-border infrastructure or trade incentives) could be floated to show a united front in uplifting the Baloch people. With Afghanistan, Pakistan should seek guarantees (possibly via the Taliban authorities or tribal intermediaries) that Baloch fighters will not be allowed to use Afghan soil for training or attacks. In return, Pakistan could offer development aid for Afghan border communities or relaxed cross-border movement for divided Baloch families – confidence-building that might sway local sympathies away from insurgents. Solving Balochistan’s conflict will be easier if it is not exacerbated by external support to militants, so proactive diplomacy is needed to cut those external links.
  

7.4 National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion

• Release and Reintegrate Political Prisoners: A national reconciliation initiative should start by releasing individuals detained for political reasons and dropping vendetta-driven charges. This especially applies to Imran Khan and his aides who have been jailed on dubious grounds. Their continued imprisonment serves only to polarise and inflame tensions. By freeing Khan (ideally through a legal pardon or bail arrangement that saves face for all sides) ¹², the government would remove a major flash point. He and other opposition figures should then be allowed to participate in politics freely, subject only to genuinely substantiated legal cases (handled through fair, normal trials). This doesn’t mean absolving corruption or crimes – rather, ensuring the judicial process is not weaponized. A one-time political amnesty could be considered for cases stemming from the 2022-2023 turmoil (covering both government and opposition actors involved in protest violence or crackdowns), turning a page on that turbulent chapter. The guiding principle should be to end the cycle of jailing each other which Pakistani parties have historically engaged in.
  
• Facilitate an All-Parties Dialogue: Pakistan’s political leadership – including government and opposition, and crucially with the tacit support of the military – should convene in a national dialogue to set basic rules of engagement moving forward. Former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and others have already called for such a dialogue involving politicians, the army, and judiciary to end the stalemate ¹². This conference (perhaps mediated by respected elder statesmen or the Pakistan Bar Association for neutrality) could result in a “Charter of Governance” with commitments such as: no party will seek army intervention against rivals; losers of elections will accept results if observers deem them fair; and winners will refrain from vindictive actions against predecessors. They could also agree on economic reform priorities that are above politics (creating consistency in policy). The military’s participation would be informal but important – for example, the Army Chief or his representatives might quietly assure the gathering of the army’s support for the democratic process so long as national security is safeguarded. An outcome of the dialogue could be consensus on key appointments (like a truly neutral caretaker government for the next election, or a mutually acceptable Chief Election Commissioner). While deeply polarised, Pakistani leaders have in the past forged unity pacts when the situation was dire – the 2006 Charter of Democracy between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto is one example. The current crisis arguably demands a similar coming together for the nation’s sake.
  
• Narrative Shift and Social Healing: The government and opposition must work to tone down the poisonous rhetoric that has characterised recent years. Accusations of treason or being “traitors” to Pakistan have been flung by all sides; this language must stop if reconciliation is to occur. Leaders should publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of their opponents as Pakistani stakeholders (even if they disagree on issues). A starting gesture could be joint visits by rival politicians to sites of national significance or to communities hit by disasters, signalling unity. The media and education system also have a role: promoting a narrative of national unity in diversity, where political differences are normal but must not tear the country apart. The state can encourage TV channels to hold debates that include diverse viewpoints rather than one-sided propaganda. It can also rein in troll farms or media cells that spread incendiary disinformation. Efforts should be made to protect and include minority groups in this reconciliation framework – for instance, addressing grievances of ethnic Pashtuns (some of whom have their own protest movement against heavy-handed security tactics) alongside Baloch and others, so no group feels left out. When citizens see their leaders engaging civilly and focusing on solving problems rather than fighting, public trust may slowly be restored.
  
• Judicial and Legal Reforms for Reconciliation: Part of reconciliation might involve legal reform to prevent future misuse of laws against political rivals. Sedition laws and broad anti-terror laws that have been abused to jail protesters should be narrowed in scope. Perhaps a new “Political Differences Act” could be legislated, which decriminalises certain actions (like peaceful protests, or verbal criticism of state institutions) that have been treated as crimes. Simultaneously, laws that hold officials accountable for rights violations should be strengthened – so that in the future, police or officers who overstep (like torturing detainees or abducting activists) face real consequences. Knowing that all sides could be out of power at some point, it would be in every party’s interest to institutionalise protections against persecution. An independent ombudsman’s office could be created to investigate claims of political victimisation and recommend remedial action. These systemic fixes would help ensure that reconciliation is not just a one-time patch-up but a lasting peace in the political realm.
  
• Engage the Youth and Diaspora: Pakistan’s youth and its overseas diaspora were significant backers of movements like Imran Khan’s, and their disillusionment can fuel instability. Reconciliation efforts should engage these groups. Domestically, youth wings of various political parties could be brought together in workshops on democratic values and conflict resolution, turning political enthusiasm into constructive activism. Internationally, Pakistani diaspora communities (who often amplify domestic divides through social media wars) could be courted as partners in nation-building – for instance, through investment initiatives or advisory councils that include diaspora experts in policy-making. If these often-polarised constituencies see a more unified message from leadership, they are more likely to temper their own extremes.
  
  

The above policy proposals aim to address the root causes of Pakistan’s crises. Economic recovery measures will stabilise finances and unleash growth potential, but they require a stable political environment to succeed. Democratic restoration will provide that stable environment by ensuring governance is accountable and inclusive, thereby making difficult reforms more palatable to the public ². Resolving the conflict in Balochistan will remove a serious internal security threat and integrate a long-alienated province into the national fold, enhancing overall stability. And national reconciliation, especially regarding Imran Khan and other opposition forces, will heal divides and reduce the zero-sum politics that have paralysed decision-making. These steps, taken together, could put Pakistan on a much stronger footing. It is a tall order – requiring courage, compromise, and foresight – but the alternative is to continue sliding down a dangerous path. Pakistan’s history shows resilience amid adversity; with the right policies, that resilience can be channelled into a new beginning that unlocks the country’s considerable human and economic potential.

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